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I. INTRODUCTION
A new legal thriller is about to be published that every lawyer in
Illinois should read. It has elements of intrigue, disputes over money,
conflict, and sex and it will definitely have something of interest for
every lawyer. It is called The Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.
Indeed, after several years in the making, the Illinois Supreme Court
will more than likely approve a complete revision of the current Rules
of Professional Conduct and replace them with a new version which is
largely based on the current American Bar Association Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("ABA Model Rules"). This fact is not surprising
given that since the early 1900s the states have looked primarily to the
ABA for guidance in this area. 1 However, the ABA Model Rules have
changed significantly in recent years; thus, the proposal to change the
Illinois Rules will result in some significant changes as well,
The ABA Model Rules were adopted in 1983 and remained largely
unchanged until 1997 when the ABA created a special commission to
evaluate and revise them as needed. The commission became known as
the "Ethics 2000 Commission" because it was expected to report its
findings and recommendations to the ABA House of Delegates in the
year 2000. However, the revision of the Rules took longer than
anticipated and the Commission did not present its final report until
August 2001.2 The report suggested many changes to the rules. Most
of those changes, in addition to some suggested by the ABA
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; B.A. Princeton University, 1984; J.D.
University of Puerto Rico Law School, 1987; LL.M., Temple University, 1994.
1. By the end of 1999 over 80% of the states, and the District of Columbia, had adopted some
version of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S.
DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT'S GUIDE § l-(e)(4), at 8 (2005).
2. Id. § 1-l(f)(1),at9.
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Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice and the ABA Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility,3 were adopted between 2002 and 2005. Since
then, twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted new
rules or revised their existing rules.
4
Illinois began the revision process in 1999 when the Illinois State Bar
Association ("ISBA") appointed a special committee to monitor the
work of the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission and to consider
recommendations for changes in the Illinois rules.5  In 2002, this
committee became a joint committee of the ISBA and the Chicago Bar
Association ("CBA") which issued a final report with recommendations
for changes in 2003.6 After considering comments on the report, the
Joint Committee issued a new report in 2004, 7 and submitted it to the
Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Professional Responsibility,
which reviewed it and issued its own report in which it agreed with
most, but not all, of the recommendations of the Joint Committee. 8
3. In August 2002, the ABA House of Delegates approved new versions of Model Rules 5.5
and 8.5 recommended by the ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice. ISBA/CBA
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS 2000, REVISED FINAL REPORT 3 (2004), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Public-Hearings/2007/ISBACBAFinalReport.pdf
[hereinafter ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT]. One year later, it approved revised
versions of Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13 recommended by the Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility. Id.
4. Letter from Richard A. Redmond, Supreme Court Committee on Professional
Responsibility, to John Nicoara, Supreme Court Rules Committee 5 (Feb. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Public Hearings/2007/ProfRespReport.pdf
[hereinafter Letter from Richard A. Redmond]. These jurisdictions and the effective dates of their
revisions are: Arizona (December 2003), Arkansas (May 2005), Connecticut (January 2007),
Delaware (July 2003), District of Columbia (February 2007), Florida (May 2006), Idaho (July
2004), Indiana (January 2005), Iowa (July 2005), Louisiana (March 2004), Maryland (July 2005),
Minnesota (October 2005), Mississippi (November 2005), Montana (April 2004), Nebraska
(September 2005), Nevada (May 2006), New Jersey (January 2004), North Carolina (March
2003), North Dakota (August 2006), Ohio (February 2007), Oregon (January 2005), Pennsylvania
(January 2005), South Carolina (October 2005), South Dakota (January 2004), Utah (November
2005), Virginia (January 2004), Washington (September 2006), Wisconsin (July 2007), and
Wyoming (July 2006). Id.
5. Id; see also Robert A. Creamer & Thomas P. Luning, Proposed New Rules of Professional
Conduct for Illinois Lawyers, 92 ILL. B.J. 306 (2004) (introducing the recommendations of the
ISBA/CBA Joint Committee on Ethics 2000 for new rules of professional conduct for Illinois
lawyers).
6. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 10.
7. Id. at 1; see supra note 3 and accompanying text (listing the new versions of the Model
Rules).
8. Letter from Richard A. Redmond, supra note 4, at 2; see supra note 4 and accompanying
text (listing the jurisdictions that have adopted new rules or revised existing rules). The Supreme
Court Committee on Professional Responsibility started its review of the ISBA/CBA Joint
Committee Report in October of 2005 and finalized it in January of 2007. Letter from Richard A.
Redmond, supra note 4, at 3. It submitted its final report in February of that same year. Id. The
Supreme Court Committee on Professional Responsibility made recommendations to the
New Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct
Together, the ISBA/CBA Joint Committee and the Supreme Court
Committee on Professional Responsibility have suggested numerous,
and in some cases, substantial changes to the current Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct. 9 In an effort to clarify these important changes
for Illinois practitioners, this Article will summarize the most important
proposed changes and discuss the debate over the more controversial
ones.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RULES
Over the years, the American Bar Association adopted codes of
professional conduct that became the basis for most states' codes.
However, the ABA is a private organization without authority to dictate
or enact statutes. In order for these codes to become applicable to
attorneys in any given state, they must be adopted by some
governmental institution with authority to do so.10 In Illinois, the State
Supreme Court has this authority. 1
Because the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct follow the design
of the ABA Model Rules, it is worthwhile to quickly outline the process
by which the Model Rules became the most important source of
regulation of the profession in this state. The move toward a uniform
code of ethics for the profession throughout the nation started in 1908
when the ABA adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics. 12 The
Canons remained in force for about sixty-two years, until the ABA
adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969.13 The Code
was divided into sections exemplifying two different perspectives on the
study of professional responsibility. It included both disciplinary rules,
the violation of which would subject an attorney to sanctions, and
ISBA/CBA Joint Committee on Ethics 2000 Revised Final Report relating to the Scope of the
rules as well as Rules 1.2, 1.6, 1.15, 6.3, 7.4, 8.4 and comment 19 to rule 1.8. Id. at Exhibit B.
9. See ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/PublicHearings/2007/04-18.pdf.
10. For many years, the ABA took the position that its Canons of Ethics and Code of
Professional Responsibility were a "private law" binding on its members regardless of state law.
ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 1-1(d), at 6. In response to attacks by the
Department of Justice, the ABA formally acknowledged that the Code was only a Model Code.
Id. However, the ABA was then very successful in persuading state and federal courts to adopt
the Model Code as law. Id.
11. The Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct are, in fact, part of the Illinois Supreme Court
Rules. They are published as Article VIII of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules. ILL. SUP. CT.
RULES art. VIII (2006).
12. See JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES &
STATUTES 482 (2007-2008).
13. Id. at 395.
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aspirational rules or ethical considerations. These aspirational rules are
essentially suggestions that, according to the drafters, could lead to a
better judicial system and to a more ethical practice but which are not
the type of rules that could be enforced by the imposition of sanctions. 14
As originally drafted, the Code focused almost exclusively on issues
related to litigation, and the ABA created a commission to revise it just
seven years after it was approved, 15 resulting in the adoption of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983.16 The ABA Model
Rules do not follow the format of the Code. They begin with a section
on Scope and a Preamble, both of which are intended to provide general
guidance as to the application of the rules and the attorney's
responsibilities. 17 The rest of the material is divided into rules and
comments. The rules explain the duties, whether mandatory or
discretionary, of attorneys in different contexts and the comments
provide an interpretation of the meaning of the rules and the original
intent of the drafters. 18
Since the enactment of the ABA Model Rules in 1983, all but six
states replaced their professional conduct codes with versions of the
ABA Model Rules. 19 Between 1997 and 2002, the ABA developed a
substantial revision to the original rules and most of the suggested
changes were adopted between 2002 and 2005. Following this lead, as
of February 2007, at least twenty-eight states and the District of
14. Id.
15. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 1-1(e)(1), at 7. The Commission was known
as the Kutak Commission for its chairman Robert J. Kutak. Id. Between 1977 and 1983, it
prepared several drafts of what later became the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Id.
16. Id.
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities (2008);
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope (2008).
18. Paragraph 21 of the Scope section of the Model Rules states that "[t]he Comment
accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule. The
Preamble and this note on Scope provide general orientation. The Comments are intended as
guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Scope 1 21 (2008).
19. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5-6. For the most current
sources of information on the ABA Model Rules, visit the website of the ABA Center for
Professional Responsibility, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/home.html. Interestingly, although
largely based on the ABA Model Rules, the rules that were eventually adopted in Illinois were
different in a number of significant ways. For example, the Illinois rules retained the concept of
confidentiality as used in the old Model Code, did not adopt a rule regarding pro bono service,
and endorsed the practice of screening lawyers with conflicts of interest when the lawyer moves
from one private law firm to another. Also, the Illinois rules did not adopt the comments to the
Model Rules.
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Columbia had adopted new rules or made substantial changes to the
existing ones. 20 Illinois is just about to join them.
The ISBAICBA Joint Committee decided early on that it would
recommend adoption of the most recent version of the ABA Model
Rules unless there was a compelling reason not to do so.2 1 In other
words, rather than amend the current rules to conform to the ABA
Model Rules, the Committee decided to discard the current rules and
adopt the ABA Model Rules with a few changes to conform to our state
law if necessary. 22 As will be discussed below, this was deemed
necessary in several instances. 23
The ISBA/CBA Joint Committee issued its final report in 2004.24
Three years later, the Supreme Court Rules Committee issued its final
report25 in which it agreed with most, but not all, of the Joint
Committee's recommendations. Both reports recommend the adoption
of the ABA Model Rules, but both suggest a number of changes, some
of which are quite significant. Most of the changes are not
controversial, but some are intriguing, if not questionable. In some
cases, the problem originates with the ABA Model Rule in question,
20. Letter from Richard A. Redmond, supra note 4, at 2; see supra note 4 and accompanying
text (listing the states that have adopted new rules or revised their existing rules).
21. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5; see also Letter from Richard
A. Redmond, supra note 4, at 9 (explaining that "the ISBA/CBA Joint Committee followed the
language of the ABA Model Rules as well as the relevant Comments unless there were major
policy considerations"). Typically, the policy considerations that resulted in suggestions to depart
from the Model Rules were based on prior decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court or on the
understanding that the text of the current Illinois Rules ought to be preserved. Id.
22. In their reports, both the ISBA/CBA Joint Committee and the Supreme Court Committee
on Professional Responsibility support this approach with several solid arguments: (1) the Model
Rules are de facto the national standard for ethics rules; (2) the Model Rules are the standard for
testing of applicants to the Bar in the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination; (3) all
the standard works on legal ethics are organized around the Model Rules; (4) following the
Model Rules will achieve a higher level of uniformity and consistency with the rules of other
jurisdictions; and (5) adopting purely unique rules could cause more problems. Letter from
Richard A. Redmond, supra note 4, at 6-9; ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3,
at 5-9. The ISBA/CBA Joint Committee also emphasized the benefit of adopting comments to
accompany the rules. Id. at 10.
23. One example is the decision to require disclosure of attorney misconduct under Rule 8.3
unless the information originated in a privileged communication, as opposed to a confidential one
which is the standard used in the Model Rules. Another example is the decision to retain a
mandatory duty to disclose certain types of information under Rule 1.6, even though the Model
Rules makes the disclosure just discretionary. A third example is the decision not to adopt Model
Rule 6.1 on the duty to provide pro bono services.
24. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 1; see supra note 3 and
accompanying text (explaining the revisions made to the Model Rules).
25. Letter from Richard A. Redmond, supra note 4, at 3; see supra note 4 and accompanying
text (listing the jurisdictions that have adopted new rules or revised their existing rules).
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while in others the problem originates in a proposed departure from the
ABA Model Rule in question.
III. SIGNIFICANT PROPOSED CHANGES TO EXISTING ILLINOIS RULES
A. The Adoption of Comments in Addition to the Rules
The first significant change in the proposed new rules relates to their
format. The current Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct were
adopted following the ABA Model Rules, but most of the Illinois Rules
were adopted without their corresponding comments. 26 This was a
mistake and the proposed new rules remedy it by recommending the
adoption of the full format of the Model Rules including the comments.
The comments provide helpful guidelines for the interpretation of the
rules, and approving them results in a significant improvement over the
current rules. As explained in the Report of the Supreme Court
Committee on Professional Responsibility:
The Comments are an integral element of the Model Rules, and they
were reviewed and revised by the Ethics 2000 Commission with the
same care and attention as the black letter rules. The ABA Comments
were also subject to the same approval process by the House of
Delegates .... A
Virtually all the black letter rules require some clarification or
additional explanation. Comments allow expanded and more specific
explanation of particular issues without cluttering the black letter
provisions with unnecessary details. Thus, the inclusion of the
comments will provide Illinois lawyers a larger base of analysis and
authority concerning their professional conduct. This additional
information could be critical to the interpretation and application of
the rules by practicing lawyers, the courts, and disciplinary agencies. 28
B. The Relationship Between Rules of Discipline and Civil Liability for
Malpractice
The relationship between the standards of conduct for disciplinary
purposes and the standard of conduct used as the basis for civil liability
in tort has never been completely clear. The ABA Model Rules have
always suggested that the duties they impose are not necessarily
26. Currently, Rule 3.8 is followed by "Committee Comments" and Rule 8.5 is followed by a
"Comment." See ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (West 2004); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.5 (West 2004).
27. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
28. Letter from Richard A. Redmond, supra note 4, at 9.
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equivalent to the standard of conduct that would support a tort claim.
The Scope section of the Model Rules attempts to explain the
distinction in this way:
Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule
is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process ....
Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action
against the lawyer nor should it create any presumption ... that a legal
duty has been breached . . . . The Rules are designed to provide
guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct
through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for
civil liability ... 2
Notwithstanding this statement, however, and although it may be true
that rules of professional conduct "are not designed to be a basis for
civil liability," in reality they are often used by courts as expressions of
a duty in tort law, or, in other words, of the minimum standard of care
expected of attorneys. 30 For this reason, in 2002, an important new
sentence was added to the comment to "reflect the decisions of courts
on the relationship between [the rules] and causes of action against a
lawyer." 3 1 This new sentence states: "Nevertheless, since the Rules do
establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule
may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct."
32
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 19-20 (2008).
30. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 1-9(c)(3), at 49-56. See Owens v.
McDermott, Will & Emery, 736 N.E.2d 145, 156-57 (I11. App. Ct. 2000) (stating that ethics rules
may be relevant to establish standard of care in malpractice cases); Griffith v. Taylor, 937 P.2d
297, 305 (Alaska 1997) (holding that attorneys owe a duty of confidentiality and a duty of loyalty
to former clients); see also Gary A. Munneke & Anthony E. Davis, The Standard of Care in
Legal Malpractice: Do the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Define It?, 22 J. LEGAL PROF.
33, 37 (1998) (proposing a new formula for the application of rules of professional conduct in
determining the standard of care to which attorneys should be held in malpractice cases); Ann
Peters, The Model Rules as a Guide for Legal Malpractice, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 609 (1993)
(discussing three methods by which the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct could be employed in legal malpractice actions). Ronald Rotunda and John
Dzienkowski have likened the determination iiia t  ""-cs should not be used in
malpractice cases to an attempt to "whistl[e] past the graveyard" because "it does no harm to
whistle, but the whistling provides no real protection either." ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra
note 1, § 1-9(c)(3), at 49. The provisions of the disciplinary rules have also been regularly used
as the basis for disqualification decisions. Id. (citing Harrison v. Fisons Corp., 819 F. Supp.
1039, 1041 (M.D. Ha. 1993)) (stating that courts have regularly relied on ethics codes in order to
establish standards for ruling on claimed conflicts of interest).
31. CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2005, 19 (2006)
[hereinafter A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
32. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT Scope 20 (2008).
2008]
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The result of this amendment, the combination of the original
statement and this new one, is a bit confusing. As used in the Model
Rules, the concept of "a basis for civil liability" must refer to the
establishment of a duty in tort law. If so, it seems inconsistent to claim
that violation of a rule can constitute evidence of a breach of a tort duty
while claiming that the rule itself should not be seen as an expression of
that duty.
What the drafters appear to want to say is that the violation of an
ethics rule does not give rise to a private cause of action separate or
distinct from a malpractice cause of action.33 But, given the
requirements of tort law, it is difficult to suggest that a violation of a
rule of professional conduct would automatically mean the lawyer has
been negligent or that a court should impose civil liability. A plaintiff
in a tort claim would have to meet all the elements of the cause of action
including a showing that the conduct caused damages. 34 Thus, it is
difficult to imagine circumstances where anyone would suggest that the
violation of a rule of professional conduct should automatically or "by
itself' mean the lawyer has been negligent or that a court should impose
civil liability.
Perhaps, on the other hand, the intent of the Model Rules approach is
to suggest that the rules are not appropriate expressions of a tort duty for
purposes of the "negligence per se" doctrine, which allows a court to
use the text of a statute to define the standard of conduct that should be
used to define a duty in tort law.35 However, the mere fact that a
33. Note that the 2002 amendment to the Model Rules also added the word "itself' to the
following sentence: "Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a
lawyer nor should it create any presumption .... " A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 31, at
18. This view has also been expressed by courts before. See, e.g., Nagy v. Beckley, 578 N.E.2d
1134, 1138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (stating that violation of ethics rules is not an independent form of
tort liability); see also Astarte, Inc. v. Pacific Indus. Sys., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 693, 705 (D. Colo.
1994) (stating that "multiple loyalties do not, per se, constitute a breach of fiduciary duty"); Baxt
v. Liloia, 714 A.2d 271, 277 (N.J. 1998) (holding that violation of rules of professional conduct
did not provide basis for civil liability against mortgagee's attorneys); Maritrans GP, Inc. v.
Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1282 (Pa. 1992) (holding that "attorney's
representation of a subsequent client whose interests are materially adverse to a former client in a
matter substantially related to matters in which he represented the former client constitutes an
impermissible conflict of interest actionable at law" independent of any violation of the code of
professional responsibility).
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 (2000) (stating that a lawyer
is liable only if the lawyer's breach of a duty of care or of a fiduciary duty is a legal cause of an
injury).
35. The justification for using a statute as an expression of a duty in tort is that the statute
reflects the fact that the legislature has taken into account the experience of the community as to
what should be the conduct in particular situations and has established a standard of care in the
statute.
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legislature adopts a statute does not mean the courts must accept it as a
basis for civil liability. The court must be convinced that the statute
provides an appropriate basis for liability. In order to make this
determination, courts typically require that the statute clearly define the
conduct for which there could be liability, that the violation of the
statute create an unreasonable risk of harm to others, that the plaintiff be
within the class of people meant to be protected by the statute and that
the damages claimed be the kind against which the statute is meant to
protect.36 In some contexts, courts also ask whether the imposition of
the doctrine of negligence per se would result in a level of liability that
is disproportionate to the seriousness of conduct.37  Thus, again, the
mere fact that a rule of professional conduct establishes a duty for
purposes of a disciplinary system does not automatically translate into
an equivalent duty in tort law.
The proposed Illinois Rules adopt, without change, the language in
the Model Rules that creates all this confusion. This is particularly
problematic in Illinois because it has already been decided that the
ethical rules can be used to establish a duty in tort. In Mayol v.
Summers, Watson & Kimpel, the court stated:
Juries in legal malpractice suits may properly consider standards of
professional ethics pertaining to attorneys because such suits involve
allegations of conduct that does not conform to minimum professional
standards . . . . [A]ttorney disciplinary rules establish minimum
standards of conduct and are intended to protect the general public.
For these reasons, we hold that jury instructions may quote attorney
disciplinary rules in legal malpractice cases to the same extent as they
may quote statutes and ordinances in instructions in other types of
negligence cases.38
A better alternative for the Illinois Rules is to eliminate the whole
section, or at least to clarify its meaning. 39 As one commentator has
suggested, although the current language in the Model Rules is closer to
36. See, e.g., Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam Corp., 488 P.2d 436, 438 (Or. 1971) (stating that
"violation of a statute or regulation constitutes negligence as a matter of law when the violation
results in injury to a member of the class of persons intended to be protected by the legislation
and when the harm is of the kind which the statute or regulation was enacted to prevent").
37. See, e.g., Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 309 (Tex. 1998) (holding that violation of a child
abuse reporting statute was not negligence per se).
38. Mayol v. Summers, Watson & Kimpel, 585 N.E.2d 1176, 1186 (111. App. Ct. 1992).
39. One commentator has argued that most of what courts have said about the materiality of a
violation of a provision of the rules of ethics for the issue of civil liability is "shameful nonsense"
and that "[m]uch of this sorry state is attributable to the pernicious disclaimers in the preambles to
the codes." Lawrence J. Latto, The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: A View From
the Trenches, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 697, 722-23 (1998) (cited in ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI,
supra note 1, § 1-9(c)(3), at 52 n.23).
2008]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
how courts use the rules, "it is likely that courts will continue to fashion
jury charges and expert reports without regard to this language." 40 If
this is the case, there is little reason to adopt a statement that will be
destined to be largely ignored.
C. Referral Fees and Splitting Fees with Attorneys in Different Law
Firms
Neither the ABA Model Rules nor the current Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct allow attorneys to receive fees for merely
referring cases to other attorneys. The main reason to ban these
"referral fees" is to prevent attorneys from recovering money when they
have not provided legal services to earn it, which is unethical. 41 Also, it
would be unethical to allow an attorney to recover a fee in a case where
the attorney has referred the case to someone else because the attorney
cannot represent the client due to a conflict of interest. 42
On the other hand, there is an interest in encouraging attorneys to
refer cases to other more qualified attorneys when, for whatever reason,
it is in the best interest of the client.43 For this reason, the ABA Model
Rules allow an attorney to share the fee in a case with another attorney
in a different firm if they share responsibilities over the case. ABA
Model Rule 1.5(e) states that a lawyer may divide a fee with another
lawyer who is not in the same firm, but only if the division is in
proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or if each lawyer
assumes joint responsibility for the representation and the client agrees
to the arrangement, the agreement is confirmed in writing and the total
fee is reasonable. 44 The distribution of the fee according to this rule is
different from the purely referral fee in that the referring attorney
receives a fee based on actual work performed for the client or based on
40. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 1-9(c)(3), at 50.
41. Charging for work not done is, by definition, unreasonable and, thus, a violation of the
rules. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2008); see also CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 71 (2007)
(citing In re Cleaver-Bascombe, 892 A.2d 396 (D.C. 2006); In re Ifill, 878 A.2d 465 (D.C. 2005);
State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Sheridan, 84 P.3d 710 (Okla. 2003); In re O'Brien, 29 P.3d 1044
(N.M. 2001); In re Schneider, 710 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1999)).
42. Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 650 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); NYSBA
Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 745 (2001); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 1.5-5, at
163.
43. As stated in the comments to Model Rule 1.5, "[a] division of fee facilitates association of
more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well .
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.5 cmt. 7 (2008).
44. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (2008).
[Vol. 39
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the fact that the attorney remains liable to the client for possible
damages caused by the attorney to whom the case is referred.
Thus, allowing attorneys to share the fee is justified because the
attorneys are, in a way, also sharing the responsibility of the
representation. However, the meaning under the Model Rules is
different from the meaning under the proposed new Illinois Rules.
Under both the Model Rules and the proposed Illinois Rules, the shared
responsibility over the representation includes responsibility for
negligent conduct by the attorney to whom the case is referred. 45
However, according to the Model Rules, it also includes possible
responsibility for unethical conduct by the attorney to whom the case is
referred because, by referring the case to another lawyer, the referring
attorney accepts the responsibility of a partner over the acts of that other
attorney.46 This type of responsibility is defined by Model Rule 5.1,
which holds that lawyers of "comparable authority" have at least
indirect responsibility for all work being done by other lawyers in their
firm.4 7 In contrast, however, the proposed Illinois rules would limit the
responsibility to possible civil liability for negligent conduct only.
Although the current Illinois Rule has the same language as the Model
Rule, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the "joint responsibility"
that the referring lawyer assumes refers only to any potential financial
responsibility for a malpractice action against the attorney to whom the
case is referred.48 Because the current Illinois Rule was adopted without
comments, this is the only current interpretation of the local rule.
For this reason, the ISBA/CBA Joint Committee's Report states that
the ABA formulation of division of fees is inconsistent with the current
law in the state of Illinois and concludes that:
It is important to encourage a lawyer to refer a client to another lawyer
in situations in which the referring lawyer is unable or ill-equipped to
handle the matter. However, to make the referring lawyer responsible
for a subsequent ethical lapse of a responsibly chosen receiving lawyer
that does not cause financial loss to the client is unnecessary
overkill. 49
45. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 9.2.4 (1986) (stating that joint
responsibility can be read as "a euphemism for assumption of joint and several liability for legal
malpractice purposes, as if the two lawyers were partners").
46. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) cmt. 7 (2008) (defining joint
responsibility as including both "financial and ethical responsibility for the representation as if
the lawyers were associated in a partnership").
47. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 cmt. 5 (2008).
48. In re Storment, 786 N.E.2d 963, 970-71 (I11. 2002).
49. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.
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In accordance with this view, the committee has recommended that
the new Illinois Rule 1.5(e) hold that lawyers can share a fee with
lawyers in other firms either on the basis of the proportion of services
they render or, where the primary service performed by one lawyer is
the referral of the client to another lawyer, if each lawyer assumes
financial responsibility for the representation as a whole.50 This
formulation of the rule has two very important distinguishing factors: it
suggests that a fee can be obtained for the "primary service" of simply
referring the case and it limits the possible responsibility of the referring
lawyer to financial, as opposed to ethical, liability.
This is a close call, but the approach of the ISBA/CBA report seems
to be better, although perhaps not for the correct reason. Rather than
being "overkill," the Model Rule seeks to provide an extra layer of
protection for potential clients. The idea behind imposing on the
referring lawyer the duty (and, thus, the possible responsibility) for the
ethical conduct of the lawyer to whom the case is referred is to
encourage the referring lawyer to be extra careful when referring a
client to someone else. As the Restatement explains, "[s]uch
assumption of responsibility discourages lawyers from referring clients
to careless lawyers in return for a large share of the fee." 51
Thus, the problem is not that the rule is "overkill." Rather, the
problem is that the enforcement of the rule might just be unfair. The
rules that impose discipline for the conduct of others are based on the
premise that the lawyers involved work closely together in the same law
firm. The reason for this type of liability is to encourage firms to make
sure they establish mechanisms to monitor the conduct of their members
and to take measures to eliminate problems.52 Attorneys organized as a
law firm have the ability to do this by creating a structure specifically
designed for this purpose. In contrast, the typical attorney who refers a
case to another attorney in a different law firm does not have the benefit
of this established structure. An attorney who refers a case to another
attorney with whom he or she has little, if any, contact and whose
practice might be in a different area of the law or in a different or distant
location, does not have the ability to monitor the conduct of the attorney
to whom the case is referred. It would not be impossible, and perhaps it
would be advisable, for the referring attorney to check in with the other
50. Id. at 63.
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 47 cmt. d (2000).
52. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 812 (stating that "partners in a law firm have
the duty to make reasonable efforts to assure that all lawyers in the firm comply with ethics
rules").
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attorney to monitor the progress in the case, but it would still be
difficult to monitor, let alone control or supervise, the ethics of this
attorney. For these reasons, it seems that the proposed rule provides
enough incentive for proper conduct and protection for the clients'
interests.
D. Duty of Confidentiality
The proposed new Illinois Rules include a number of significant, and
in some cases controversial, changes to the duty of confidentiality.
These include a significant change in the approach to the concept of
confidentiality itself and an expansion of the areas of mandatory and
permissive disclosure of confidential information.
1. Changes to the Scope of the Duty of Confidentiality
When Illinois adopted its current Rules of Professional Conduct, it
did not adopt the concept of confidentiality contained in the ABA
Model Rules at the time.53 Instead, the Illinois Rules retained the
concept as it appeared in the (by then rejected) Model Code which made
a distinction between information that constituted a "confidence" and
information that constituted a "secret." 54 Thus, according to the current
rules, a confidence is defined as "information protected by the attorney-
client privilege" and a secret is defined as "information gained in the
professional relationship, that the client has requested be held inviolate
or the revelation of which would be embarrassing to or would likely be
detrimental to the client."55
Although the current approach has survived for decades, causing
perhaps only one major problem, 56 it is a good idea to eliminate it
formally and to adopt the much more accepted formulation of the
concept of confidentiality currently found in the ABA Model Rules.
Thus, under the proposed new rules, confidential information would be
defined as "information relating to the representation" 57 regardless of
who is the source of the information, whether it is detrimental to the
53. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003), with ILL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007).
54. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007).
55. See id. (defining terms used throughout the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct).
56. See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 794 (1988). The problem, which is discussed below,
is the anomalous application of the rule regarding the disclosure of another attorney's misconduct
even if it requires disclosure of confidential information. Id. The court in Himmel would have
reached a different result if it had applied the analysis of the Model Rules.
57. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Public-Hearings/2007/04-18.pdf.
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client and whether the client specifically requested that it be kept
confidential.58 For this reason, the duty of confidentiality under the
proposed new rule would protect a much broader range of information
than it does under the current Illinois Rules.
The most significant change being proposed to the duty of
confidentiality, however, relates to the circumstances where disclosure
of confidential information would be either mandatory or permissive.
In 2002, the ABA adopted amendments to the Model Rules that
expanded the areas of permissible disclosure of confidential
information. 59 These were some of the most contested issues during the
process of enacting the revisions to the Model Rules and there is a
strong debate as to whether adopting the changes was a mistake. 6
0
The first new element in the current Model Rule states that if an
attorney's services are used to advance a fraudulent scheme, the
attorney can disclose confidential client information to prevent the
commission of the fraudulent act.61 Having rejected a similar rule three
times in the past,62 the ABA approved this provision in response to the
Enron, WorldCom, and HealthSouth scandals and due to pressure from
the Securities and Exchange Commission.63 Allowing disclosure of
confidential information to prevent a fraudulent act was a significant
change for the Model Rules, but adopting a similar rule in Illinois would
58. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (stating that the "confidentiality rule
applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information
relating to the representation, whatever its source").
59. Before these amendments Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) allowed a lawyer to reveal "information
... to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result
in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)
(1983). The amendment changed this to allow a lawyer to disclose information "to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6(b)(1) (2003). The amendment also added two new sections to the rule that allow disclosure of
confidential information to prevent conduct that may result in financial injury, to prevent
financial injury and to rectify financial injury. Id. R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3).
60. MONROE FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER'S ETHICS 3d 141 (2004)
(noting that proposals about confidentiality issues were widely debated prior to the approval of
the original Model Rules in 1983).
61. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2003).
62. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 60, at 141 (stating that in 1983, a provision that
permitted a lawyer to reveal information to prevent substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of another or to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the
furtherance of which the lawyer's services had been used was defeated by the House of Delegates
by a vote of 207 to 129). Likewise, similar proposals were again defeated in 1991 (by a vote of
251 to 158) and in 2001 by a similar strong vote. Id. at 142, 145.
63. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 1.6-12(e)(3), at 241. The vote in favor of
approving this new exception to the duty of confidentiality was 218-201. FREEDMAN & SMITH,
supra note 60, at 146.
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only expand slightly the extent of possible disclosures of confidential
information. Other than expanding the disclosure to include civil
frauds, adopting this rule actually would not change the current Illinois
rule much because Illinois Rule 1.6(c)(2) already states that a lawyer
may reveal a client's intention to commit a crime.64
Because the rule only applies when the attorney's services are used to
advance the client's fraud, it seems that the purpose of the rule is to
prevent a lawyer from becoming an unwilling instrument of a fraud in
progress. 65 However, several strong arguments have been advanced
that suggest that an exception to the duty of confidentiality, which
arguably weakens the duty of confidentiality and with it a client's trust,
is not necessary to prevent a lawyer from participating in his or her
client's fraudulent conduct.
First, there are several rules already in place to prevent a lawyer from
participating in a client's fraudulent scheme. For example, Rule 1.2(d)
states that a lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.66
Rule 1.16 states that the lawyer must terminate the attorney-client
relationship if the representation would result in a violation of the
rules.67 Finally, Rule 8.4(c) states that a lawyer would be subject to
discipline for dishonest or fraudulent conduct. 68
Second, by recognizing discretion to share confidential information,
the rule may open the door to civil liability if courts begin to interpret
the rule to mean that there is a minimum duty to reveal this type of
information under certain circumstances. 69 Just because the attorney
has discretion does not mean that the exercise of that discretion is by
definition reasonable (or not negligent). A court could decide that,
under the circumstances of a particular case, the attorney was negligent
in exercising his or her discretion.
Finally, some argue that because the new rule weakens the duty of
confidentiality, it diminishes the value of the trust clients have for their
64. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(2) (2007).
65. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 60, at 147.
66. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003).
67. Id. R. 1.16.
68. Id. R. 8.4(c).
69. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 1.6-12(e)(3), at 241. Apparently, this was
one of the arguments used in support of the rejection of an earlier version of the rule by the ABA
House of Delegates. Id. (citing as an example the decision in State v. Hansen, 862 P.2d 117, 122
(1993) (recognizing a duty to warn)).
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lawyers. 70  According to this argument, the rule may result in
"deputizing" the lawyer in order to monitor the client's activities,
creating a somewhat adversarial relationship between attorneys and
clients while the policy behind the rule may be better served by
preserving confidentiality. The attorney may be in a better position to
prevent or rectify the fraud if the client's trust is stronger.
71
The exceptions recognized in Model Rule 1.6(b)(3) are even more
problematic. Pursuant to this new rule, if the fraudulent act has already
been committed, the attorney may disclose confidential information in
order to prevent the financial injury that would result from the act.72 If
it is too late to prevent financial injury, the attorney may disclose the
information in order to rectify the injury. 73  The adoption of these
sections is very significant. Before this amendment was approved,
Model Rule 1.6 limited the circumstances that justified disclosing
confidential information to situations where disclosure of the
information was necessary to prevent future conduct. 7
4
In fact, this new exception to the duty of confidentiality is even more
far-reaching than the exception contemplated in the original comment to
Model Rule 1.6. This comment stated that if the lawyer's services were
going to be used by the client in materially furthering a crime or fraud,
the lawyer had to withdraw and could give notice of the withdrawal and
withdraw or disaffirm any document prepared for purposes of the
representation. 75  Once adopted, the text of the comment essentially
opened the door for a lawyer to indirectly alert others that something
was wrong. 76  The comment, therefore, created an expansion to the
exceptions in the text of the rule itself. But even under the analysis of
70. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 60, at 147 (arguing that the ABA has threatened
confidentiality).
71. Id.
72. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (2003).
73. Id.
74. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 60, at 147. For the 2001 version of the Model Rules, see
DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 12, at 128-29.
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.6 cmt. 15-16 (1983). Professor Freedman has
argued that this silent disclosure provision was added to the comment "disingenuously" after the
rule itself had been adopted and it was approved at a separate meeting "without the same close
attention and debate." FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 60, at 142 (citing Geoffrey Hazard,
Rectification of Client Fraud and Revival of a Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271, 306
(1984)).
76. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 60, at 143 (citing Ronald Rotunda, The Notice of
Withdrawal and the New Rules of Professional Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the
Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REV. 455 (1984) for the proposition that the consequences of the comment
did not allow a lawyer to blow the whistle but it did allow the lawyer to waive a red flag).
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the comment, a lawyer could only disclose confidential information to
avoid furthering a crime or fraud that had not yet been completed.77
The new Model Rule 1.6(b)(3) expands the duty even further,
allowing disclosure of confidential information concerning a fraud that
has already been completed. It allows an attorney to do something that
was not allowed even by the exception to the duty of confidentiality
hidden in the comment. This is new and very troubling for some
commentators. Because the rule does not allow disclosure about past
conduct other than conduct that has resulted in financial injury, some
argue that the new rule weakens the duty of confidentiality "to provide
greater protection to someone who has lost money to the client through
fraud, than to a person who has been intentionally maimed by the client
or to the spouse of someone who has been murdered by the client."78
The reasoning behind the Model Rule is to allow the attorney to
rectify a wrong for which the client used the attorney's services. This is
a good goal, but it is not necessary to weaken the duty of confidentiality
to achieve it. Because the rule limits its applicability to cases where the
attorney's services were (or are being) used to commit the fraud, such
testimony by the attorney would be admissible under the law of
evidence under the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege. 79 For example,80 assume that the client uses the attorney's
services to obtain a loan fraudulently. When the lender discovers the
fraud, the lender can subpoena the lawyer and the client could not claim
the privilege to prevent the attorney from testifying. Thus, allowing the
lawyer to disclose confidential information related to fraudulent conduct
is not necessary in cases where the victims of fraud take action against
the perpetrator of the fraud.
The proposed new rules for Illinois also expand the area of mandated
disclosure. The current Illinois Rule mandates disclosure of
information to prevent the client from committing an act that would
result in death or serious bodily harm. 81 The new proposed exceptions
to the duty of confidentiality expand this mandate by requiring
disclosure of confidential information to prevent "reasonably certain
death or substantial bodily harm." 82 Because there is no requirement
77. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 60, at 147.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. ROTUNDA & DzIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 251-52.
81. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2007).
82. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/
SupremeCourt/PublicHearings/2007/04-18.pdf.
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that the disclosure be limited to conduct of the client, this is a
significant change with which Illinois would join only a very small
number of states. 8
3
2. Confidentiality and the Entity Client
ABA Model Rule 1.13, which regulates certain aspects of the
attorney-client relationship when the client is an entity, also contains an
exception to the duty of confidentiality. 84 The ABA Model Rule
provides that when a lawyer has reported a "violation of law" by a
corporate constituent to the organization's highest authority and the
organization fails to take timely remedial action, the lawyer may
disclose client confidences outside the organization to the extent
necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organizational client.85
This is a major change from earlier versions of the Model Rule, but it is
not surprising given the move to expand the exceptions to the duty of
confidentiality under Rule 1.6.
However, it should be noted that the language of Model Rule 1.13 is
currently inconsistent with that of Model Rule 1.6.86 Proposed Illinois
Rule 1.13 addresses this issue by changing the language in Rule 1.13
83. Only thirteen states have mandatory disclosure: Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois,
Iowa, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
SUSAN MARTYN, LAWRENCE Fox & W. BRADLEY WENDEL, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS,
NATIONAL RULES, STANDARDS, STATUTES, AND STATE LAWYER CODES 120-23 (2006-2007).
As the ISBA/CBA Joint Committee Report states, the mandatory disclosure requirement
represents a strongly-held policy position in Illinois, but it is interesting to consider the arguments
in support of an alternative. For example, Professor Monroe Freedman, who for many years
advocated the need of a mandatory disclosure requirement, now argues in favor of the Model
Rule's approach. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 60, at 152. He has stated that one type of case
that helped persuade him is the type of case "where the lawyer learns that her client has agreed
with a loved one who is terminally ill and in great pain to assist that person to commit suicide."
Id. At the other end of the spectrum, Professor Abbe Smith prefers "a strict principle that client
secrets and confidences are sacrosanct and lawyers should not divulge them under any
circumstances." Id. at 154. She believes that "in the rare case where it is truly necessary to
disclose information obtained through the lawyer-client relationship (to stop the wrong person
from being executed, to prevent premeditated murder, to prevent mayhem), a lawyer will do so
notwithstanding the principle, and that the lawyer will not be disciplined for it. Id. Regardless of
how difficult the circumstances may be, Smith believes that maintaining and preserving
confidentiality is more important than affirming lawyer morality. Id. To this position, Freedman
replies that "if lawyers will act that way in those rare cases, and if their actions will be condoned
by disciplinary authorities, then the rules should comport with reality. It does not promote
respect for law to promulgate rules with no expectations of either obedience or enforcement." Id.
at 154 n.135.
84. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.13(c) (2003).
85. Id. R. 1.13.
86. Compare id. R. 1.6 (referring to disclosure of information to prevent or remedy "crime or
fraud"), with id. R. 1.13 (referring to disclosures related to "violation of law").
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and making it consistent with Rule 1.6.87 Thus, the proposed rule
would allow the attorney to disclose confidential information only if the
misconduct involved amounts to a crime or fraud, rather than a
"violation of law." 88  In that sense, the proposed Illinois Rule is an
improvement over the Model Rule.
In addition, the proposed Illinois Rule is an improvement because it
better explains the relationship between the two rules. Just like Model
Rule 1.6, Model Rule 1.13 allows disclosure of confidential information
to prevent fraudulent conduct, but the purpose of the rule is
fundamentally different. While Model Rule 1.6 allows disclosure to
protect the victim of the fraudulent conduct, Model Rule 1.13 allows
disclosure only to protect the client. The language of Model Rule 1.13
is not concerned with any victim outside the corporate client.
89
This discrepancy suggests that the rules give more protection to
confidential information of corporate clients. 90 Under Model Rule 1.13,
if a member of the corporation acts in a way that threatens innocent
third parties, the attorney may disclose the information only to prevent
substantial injury to the organization, and only to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary. 91 The fact that the fraud may cause
substantial injury to a third party, which is the driving force of the
exceptions in Model Rule 1.6, is irrelevant to the analysis under Model
Rule 1.13. If there is no reasonably certain substantial injury to the
organization, the attorney seems precluded from disclosing the
information under Model Rule 1.13 even if doing so would help prevent
injury to others and, thus, is likely allowed under Model Rule 1.6. For
this reason, some argue that Model Rule 1.6 "permits a lawyer to blow
the whistle on an individual client's fraud, but [Model Rule] 1.13
87. See ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/PublicHearings/2007/04-18.pdf (changing each rule
or comment reference to a "violation of law," to "a crime, fraud or other violation of law");
ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 20-21.
88. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Public-Hearings/2007/04-18.pdf; ISBA/CBA JOINT
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 20-21.
89. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 60, at 148.
90. Id. Professor Freedman is even more critical, claiming that Model Rule 1.13 "was
designed from the outset by the corporate bar to give special protection to corporate clients, and
this preferential treatment was accepted by the Kutak Commission in order to get the
endorsement of the Model Rules from the ABA's powerful Corporate Section." Id.; see also
Monroe Freedman, Lawyer Client Confidences: The Model Rules' Radical Assault on Tradition,
68 ABA J. 428, 432 (1982) (stating that when dealing with corporate clients, a lawyer may almost
never reveal the truth of a corporate client's actions).
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003).
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forbids it when the client is a corporation" 92 and that "the ABA has
given the interests of corporate clients far greater protection than those
of individual clients." 93
For these reasons, the comment to proposed Rule 1.13 attempts to
provide a better explanation of the relationship between both rules by
stating that:
Paragraph (c) of this Rule supplements Rule 1.6(b) by providing an
additional basis upon which the lawyer may reveal information
relating to the representation, but does not modify, restrict, or limit the
provisions of Rule 1.6(b) .... If the lawyer's services are being used
by an organization to further a crime or fraud by the organization,
Rules 1.6(b)(1), 1.6(b)(2) or 1.6(b)(3) may permit the lawyer to
disclose confidential information. 94
It is important to remember, though, that paragraph (b) of ABA
Model Rule 1.6 does not require disclosure; it merely allows it.95 If
Rule 1.13 does not allow the attorney to disclose certain information,
and Rule 1.6 allows it but does not require it, the attorney has a strong
incentive not to disclose since it would be against the corporate client's
interests to do so and would be a violation of Rule 1.13(c). Also, Model
Rule 1.6 allows disclosure to avoid or rectify financial injury only if the
attorney's services are used to advance the client's crime or fraud.96 In
the typical circumstances where an in-house attorney discovers
wrongdoing by a constituent of the corporation this would not be the
case. Although disclosure might avert or rectify the injury, since the
goal is not to protect the innocent third party, the disclosure is not
allowed.
E. Communicating with Persons Represented by Counsel
Current Illinois Rule 4.2 attempts to regulate attempts by attorneys to
communicate directly with other persons who are represented by
92. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 60, at 151. For a discussion of this topic, see id. at 147-
51. It is also interesting that the language of the new Model Rule 1.13 is more restrictive than
that of the old one. Before 2003, the attorney was allowed to act if the conduct in question was
"likely" to result in injury to the client. Currently, the attorney can disclose information only if it
is "reasonably certain" that the conduct will result in injury to the client. Id.
93. Id. Professor Ronald Rotunda reaches a different conclusion, though. He argues that
because attorneys are allowed to reveal confidential information of corporate clients under two
rules, the rules grant organizational clients less protection than they provide to non-organizational
clients, whose confidential information can be disclosed only as an exception to one rule.
ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 1.13-2, at 558.
94. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 6 (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Public-Hearings/2007/04-18.pdf.
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2003).
96. Id. R. 1.6(b)(3).
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counsel. The title of the rule is "Communications With Person
Represented by Counsel."97 Yet, the actual text of the rule is limited to
communications with a "party," which is much more limited.98 The
proposed new Illinois Rule fixes this important discrepancy and clarifies
the extent of the application of the rule in the entity client context,
making it a vast improvement over the current rule.99 The comment to
the rule also clarifies the interplay between the rule and a client's right
to communicate with another party. '00
These may seem like relatively minor changes, but in fact they are
very significant. Under the current rule, it is not clear whether a lawyer
who represents a client in litigation against a corporation can informally
interview employees of the corporation without notifying the attorney
for the corporation. The case law in Illinois is conflicting. In Fair
Automotive v. Car-X Service Systems,' 0' for example, the court
interpreted the word "party" to include only the members of the
organization's "control group," a concept usually used in the context of
the application of the attorney-client privilege in the representation of
an organization, 10 2 while Weibrecht v. Southern Illinois Transfer,
Inc., 10 3 rejected this interpretation. The court in this case reasoned that
since the current Illinois Rule was derived from the Model Rule at the
97. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2007).
98. Id. The current rule reads:
During the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not communicate or cause
another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer
knows to be represented by another lawyer in that matter unless the first lawyer has
obtained the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or as may
otherwise be authorized by law.
Id.
99. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Public-Hearings/2007/04-18.pdf. The new rule would
read as follows:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in
the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do
so by law or a court order.
Id.
100. Id. R. 4.2 cmt. 4. The comment states, "Parties to a matter may communicate directly
with each other, and a lawyer is not prohibited from advising a client concerning a
communication that the client is legally entitled to make." Id.
101. Fair Automotive Repair, Inc. v. Car-X Service Systems, Inc., 471 N.E.2d 554, 561 (II.
App. Ct. 1984).
102. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1991). In Upjohn, the
Supreme Court refers to a control group as the group of officers and agents responsible for
directing the organization's actions in response to legal advice. Id.
103. Weibrecht v. S. Ill. Transfer, Inc., 241 F.3d 875, 881-83 (7th Cir. 2001).
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time of its adoption, the proper way to interpret its meaning would be to
look at the comment to the Model Rule even though the Illinois Rule
was adopted without the comments. 10
4
The comment to the new proposed rule clarifies the debate by stating
that in the case of a represented organization:
[The] Rule prohibits communications with a constituent of the
organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the
organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to
obligate the organization with respect to the matter or whose act or
omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the
organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability . . . . If a
constituent of the organization is represented in the matter by his or
her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will
be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. 105
Not surprisingly, there is also disagreement on the propriety of
communications with former employees. Many courts, as well as the
ABA Model Rules, have taken the position that former employees do
not have a relationship with their former employers and therefore
attorneys are free to contact them without notice to opposing counsel for
the entity.' 0 6 At the other end of the spectrum, some jurisdictions ban
ex parte contacts with former employees. 10 7 Yet another view allows
contacts unless the objecting party can establish that the ex-employee's
role was central enough to the litigation to be the basis of potential
imputed liability. 10 8 Finally, another view bans ex parte contacts with
ex-employees only if the ex-employee had been in a position to create
or implement company policies relevant to the allegations of the
lawsuit.10 9
Again, the proposed new comment to the rule takes care of this
debate very clearly. It states that a lawyer does not need to obtain
104. Id. This shows another reason why it is a much better approach to adopt the comments
as they are being suggested presently.
105. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/PublicHearings/2007/04-18.pdf.
106. E.g., Orlowski v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 723, 728 (N.D. Ill. 1996);
Valassis v. Samuelson, 143 F.R.D. 118, 123 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Sanifill of Georgia, Inc. v.
Roberts, 502 S.E.2d 343, 345 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2
cmt. 7 (2003); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991).
107. E.g., N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2, 1.13 (banning ex parte contact with former
agents and employees who were members of the litigation control group); Armsey v. Medshares
Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 569, 572-73 (W.D. Va. 1998); Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v.
Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd. 745 F. Supp. 1037, 1039-40 (D.N.J. 1990).
108. Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 89 (D.N.J. 1991).
109. In re The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 911 F. Supp. 148, 153 (D.N.J.
1995).
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consent from the organization's lawyer to communicate directly with a
former constituent of the organization. 110
F. Lawyer as a Witness
The proposed new rule addressing the issue of whether an attorney
can represent a client if the attorney would have to testify in the client's
case is an improvement over the current version."11 When Illinois
adopted its current rule, it did not follow the applicable ABA Model
Rule at the time. 112 Instead, the current Illinois rule makes a distinction
between situations in which the lawyer would be a witness for the client
and situations in which the lawyer would be called as a witness other
than on behalf of the client. 113 In most cases, the lawyer would be
disqualified in the first situation. 1 1 4 In the second, the lawyer would be
disqualified only if the lawyer's testimony would be prejudicial to the
client. 115 However, as explained in the ISBA/CBA Joint Committee
Report, this distinction:
... ignores the basic purposes of the rule. The rule is intended to
protect both the tribunal and the opposing party by avoiding fact-
finder confusion between the roles of advocate and witness and by
avoiding the prospect that the client whose lawyer also testifies may
have an advantage. Those risks are the same, whether the lawyer
testifies for the client or for the adversary. 1 16
For this reason, the Committee recommends adopting the current
Model Rule which states that a lawyer shall not act as an advocate at a
trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless the
testimony relates to an uncontested issue, the testimony relates to the
nature and value of legal services rendered in the case, or
disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the
client. 117
110. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/PublicHearings/2007/04-18.pdf.
111. Compare id. R. 3.7 (the proposed new rule), with ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7
(2007) (the current version of the rule).
112. For the original version of the Model Rule, see DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 12, at 173.
113. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(a)-(b) (2007).
114. See id. R. 3.7(a) (defining four situations in which the lawyer may testify on behalf of the
client).
115. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 30.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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IV. SOME PROPOSED NEW RULES
The proposed Illinois Rules include a number of brand new rules.
For example, Rule 2.4 regulates the duties of a lawyer as a third party
neutral1 18 and Rule 3.9 states the duties of a lawyer serving as an
advocate in nonadjudicative proceedings. 119  There is nothing
particularly controversial about these new rules. There are, however, a
few new rules that merit some discussion.
A. Conflict of Interest Based on Sexual Relations with Clients
The proposed new Illinois Rules adopt ABA Model Rule 1.8(j) which
states that a lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a
consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the client-
lawyer relationship commenced regardless of whether the relationship is
consensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client. 120
However, even if a lawyer is prohibited from representing a client
because of a sexual relationship, the rule does not preclude other
lawyers in the same firm from representing the client. 121
The proposed rule is based on a sound policy: a sexual relationship
between lawyer and client can involve unfair exploitation of the
lawyer's fiduciary role in violation of the lawyer's basic ethical
obligation not to use the trust of the client to the client's
disadvantage. 122 The attorney's emotional involvement can also affect
118. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4 (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Public-Hearings/2007/04-18.pdf. The ISBA/CBA
Committee explained the need for this new rule this way:
This is a new rule. It is appropriate to promulgate such a rule in light of increased
use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and lawyers' frequent participation in
them as a neutral. The model rule sets generally reasonable standards and offers good
guidance to lawyers.
In one respect, however, the rule leaves too much room for subsequent problems
that could be easily avoided. Model Rule 2.4(b) requires a lawyer serving as third-party
neutral to inform unrepresented parties in every case that the lawyer is not representing
them. However, it requires the lawyer to go on to explain the difference between a
lawyer's role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client
only when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not
understand the lawyer's role. The Committee believes that a complete explanation is
better in every case involving unrepresented parties, and proposes to revise Model Rule
2.4(b) accordingly.
ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 25.
119. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.9 (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Public Hearingsl2007/04-18.pdf.
120. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j) cmt. 17 (2003).
121. Id. R. 1.8(k).
122. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.80) cmt 17 (2003); see also In re Rinella, 677
N.E.2d 909 (Ill. 1997) (concluding that an attorney's sexual relationship with client was
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his or her independent judgment and create a risk that the representation
would be materially affected which, by itself, would be a violation of
the rules. 123  Finally, the relationship could also make it unlikely that
the client could give adequate informed consent to the possible conflict
and can create a significant danger of harm to the client's interests.124
These policies, however, are already covered by the Rules125 that
require competence 126 and diligence, 127 and, most importantly, by Rule
1.7 which bans a lawyer from representing a client if there is a
prejudicial to the administration of justice and overreaching); People v. Good, 893 P.2d 101
(Colo. 1995) ("Because the lawyer stands in a fiduciary relationship with the client, an unsolicited
sexual advance by the lawyer debases the essence of the lawyer-client relationship."). The ABA
Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility had expressed this view in 1992 in Formal
Opinion 92-364. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-364 (1992).
In response to this opinion, several states adopted express rules to regulate sexual relations
between attorneys and clients. See, for example, the rules in Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, New
York, North Carolina, Oregon, West Virginia, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. California had
already adopted a similar rule in 1987. Kathleen Maher, Sex With Clients: The Progeny of ABA
Opinion 92-364, THE PROF. LAW., Winter 2001, at 20 n.4.
123. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2003) (stating, in part, that "a
lawyer shall not represent a client if... there is a significant risk that the representation of one or
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former
client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer"); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2003) (stating that in representing a client "a lawyer shall exercise
independent professional judgment"). Several courts have held that engaging in a sexual
relationship threatens a lawyer's ability to exercise independent professional judgment. See, e.g.,
In re Grimm, 674 N.E.2d 551, 554 (Ind. 1996) (concluding that the attorney engaged in
misconduct by having a sexual relationship with a client); In re Ashy, 721 So.2d 859, 864 (La.
1999) ("A sexual relationship between lawyer and client may involve unfair exploitation of the
lawyer's fiduciary position, and/or significantly impair a lawyer's ability to represent the client
competently."); In re Halverson, 988 P.2d 833, 840-41 (Wash. 2000) (discussing the
unreasonableness of an attorney's sexual relationship with a marriage dissolution client).
124. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 17 (2003).
125. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2), 2.1 (2003) (broadly defining
impermissible conflicts of interest and requiring an attorney to render candid advice by
considering not only the law but also moral, social, and political factors). In Formal Opinion 92-
364, the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility concluded that even though
there was no specific rule that regulated sexual relations with clients at the time, several other
rules are implicated by such a relationship. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility,
Formal Op. 92-364 (1992). In addition, a number of courts have held that the absence of a
specific rule does not preclude the imposition of discipline under any number of other rules. See,
e.g., In re Heard, 963 P.2d 818, 825 (Wash. 1998) ("Despite the absence of an express rule
banning attorney-client sexual relations, an attorney's sexual relations with a client can constitute
'moral turpitude,' justifying the imposition of disciplinary sanctions."); Musick v. Musick, 453
S.E.2d 361, 354 (W. Va. 1994) (reasoning that, although a lawyer's sexual relationship with a
client was not an express violation of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, other
rules of professional conduct may have been violated by that relationship); see also Bourdon's
Case, 565 A.2d 1052, 1056-58 (N.H. 1989) (finding that the attorney violated several New
Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct that do not specifically mention sexual relations).
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2003).
127. Id. R. 1.3.
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significant risk that the representation will be materially limited by a
personal interest of the lawyer. 128 Of course, if the policy behind the
rule is protected already by interpreting other rules, a new rule would
simply clarify the existing policy and state it clearly in one place.
129
As proposed, however, the rule raises concerns that need attention.
For example, some are concerned that state intervention in this matter
might be an impermissible intrusion on privacy, and that there is a
danger of abuse of the rule by disgruntled clients. 130 More importantly,
some are concerned about the rule's effectiveness. Assume, for
example, that an attorney in a large law firm begins a relationship with
an important long-standing client of the firm. At that point, the lawyer
would not be allowed to represent the client, but other lawyers in the
firm could continue the representation. The rule does not state that the
disqualified lawyer must be screened from the representation, however.
This means that the lawyer, although not participating in the
representation, could have access to information about the case. Under
such circumstances, it is worth wondering how much independent
judgment a lawyer would feel free to exercise knowing he or she
represents the sexual partner of a colleague in the firm, particularly if
the lawyer assigned to represent the client is a subordinate of the lawyer
involved with the client. Imagine the pressure on an associate if he
knows he represents the sexual partner of a supervising partner of the
128. Id. R. 1.7. See, e.g., Horaist v. Doctor's Hosp. of Opelousas, 255 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir.
2001) ("A sexual relationship with a client that arises during the course of the representation may
create a conflict between the professional and personal interests of the lawyer and interfere with
the lawyer's professional judgment."); In re Tsoutsouris, 748 N.E.2d 856, 860 (Ind. 2001)
(concluding that an attorney violated a prohibition against representations that may be materially
limited by the attorney's own interests and prejudiced the administration of justice by engaging in
a sexual relationship with a client while he was representing her, even though the relationship was
consensual); Bourdon's Case, 565 A.2d at 1057 (finding that the lawyer's sexual relationship
materially limited the lawyer's representation of the client); In re Joslin, 13 P.3d 1286, 1290
(Kan. 2000) (concluding that the attorney's alleged sexual relationship with a client violated the
rule prohibiting an attorney from representing a client if such representation could be materially
limited by attorney's own interests).
129. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 31, at 209 ("Although recognizing that most
egregious behavior ... can be addressed through other Rules[,] ... having a specific rule has the
advantage not only of alerting lawyers more effectively to the dangers of sexual relationships
with clients but also of alerting clients that the lawyer may have violated ethical obligations in
engaging in such conduct.").
130. See, e.g., Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101 (111. App. Ct. 1990). In this case the
court denied a cause of action for damages based on an allegation that an attorney breached a duty
to the client by engaging in sexual relations because "[t]he potential for abuse would be too great"
and could "have a grave potential to be used for blackmail by unscrupulous persons seeking
unjust enrichment." Id. at 106 n.3.
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firm, particularly if the partner is not officially screened from all
information about the case.
Amending the rule to impute the conflict on other members of the
firm raises additional and different problems. The attorney involved in
the sexual relationship would have to quit the firm or stop the
relationship. The firm would have to fire the lawyer or terminate the
representation of the client. The client would have to fire the law firm
or end the relationship. None of these options would be very appealing
to the parties involved: neither the client nor the law firm would want to
terminate their long-standing relationship, the lawyer would not want to
quit the job, the lawyer and client presumably would not want to end
their personal relationship, the client would not want to see his or her
personal friend get fired, and the firm would not want to fire a valued
member. There is a real chance that the rule would simply be ignored in
such a situation, perhaps by removing the attorney from assignments
involving the client but preserving the representation by the firm in
violation of rule 1.8(k). In other words, problems arise regardless of
whether the rule imputes the conflict to the firm.
In addition, the proposed rule does not apply if the sexual relationship
between the attorney and the client already existed when the client-
lawyer relationship began. 131 According to the comment to the rule, the
issues "relating to the exploitation of the fiduciary relationship and
client dependency are diminished when the sexual relationship existed
prior to the commencement of the client-lawyer relationship." '132 Thus,
the attorney is simply reminded of the duty to avoid conflicts that might
materially limit the representation. Although it is understandable, this
aspect of the rule does not seem to be consistent with the policy that
suggests a specific rule is needed in the first place. If it is the personal
relationship that creates the undesirable circumstances that call into
question the attorney's independent judgment, the fact that the sexual
relationship predates the professional relationship does not quite
eliminate the problem.
Finally, it is interesting to note that this is one of the few rules about
which the ISBA/CBA Joint Committee and the Supreme Court
Committee on Professional Responsibility disagree. The ISBA/CBA
131. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.80) (2003). If the relationship existed before
the professional relationship, the exploitation of the fiduciary duties and the possibility of client
dependency are diminished. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 1.8-11, at 393 (citing
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j) cmt. 18 (2003) and Attorney Grievance Comm'n of
Md. v. Culver, 849 A.2d 423 (Md. 2004)).
132. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j) cmt. 18 (2003).
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Report suggests that the comment should clarify that the rule does not
apply when the client is an organization. 133  The Supreme Court
Committee on Professional Responsibility, on the other hand, takes the
position that the new Illinois Rules should adopt the original language
in the comment to the ABA Model Rules which states that the rule
"prohibits a lawyer for the organization (whether inside counsel or
outside counsel) from having a sexual relationship with a constituent of
the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with that
lawyer concerning the organization's legal matters."' 134
This second position is more sound. One main purpose of the rule is
to make sure that the attorney's relationship with a client does not affect
his or her exercise of independent professional judgment. 135  An
attorney who gets involved with a member of the entity client with
whom the attorney works regularly can create the risk of a personal
conflict of interest that can affect the representation just as much as in
the case of an individual client.
B. Duties to Prospective Clients
The concept of a prospective client is not new, but only recently has
it been regulated in rules of professional conduct. 136  To do so, the
proposed new Illinois Rules adopt ABA Model Rule 1.18, which, as
stated in the ISBA/CBA Joint Committee Report, fills in a gap in the
prior rules.1 37
Assume, for example, that a prospective client asks a lawyer to
consider taking on a case against one of the attorney's current clients.
The attorney could not accept the new case because it would create a
conflict of interest and promptly rejects the client's request. Assume
further that during the consultation the prospective client revealed
confidential information that would be detrimental to the prospective
133. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 19 (2003).
134. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITFEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 17 ("Comment [19] to MR 1.8,
dealing with the application of MR 1.80) to organizational clients, goes too far .... There is no
record of abuse in such situations, and [the] representatives [of organizational clients] do not need
the protection that other clients in vulnerable positions may require.").
135. Id. R. 1.8 cmt. 17.
136. The 1983 version of the Model Rules did not recognize duties to prospective clients, but
did mention the possibility in paragraph 17 of its Preamble saying that "there are some duties ...
that attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client lawyer relationship shall be
established." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (1983); see also ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-358 (1990) (regulating information imparted to a
lawyer by a would-be client seeking legal representation even though the lawyer does not
undertake representation of or perform legal work for the would-be client).
137. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 23-24.
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client and beneficial to the current client. This situation, which is not
that uncommon, raises many questions: whether the attorney can
represent the current client if the prospective client files the claim;
whether the attorney can disclose to the current client the information
received during the consultation; whether the attorney can use the
information to the benefit of the current client; and, if the attorney is
precluded from representing the current client against the prospective
client, whether another attorney in the same firm can do so. Depending
on how these questions are answered and the duties to the different
parties are defined, the same questions could have civil liability
implications.
Proposed new Rule 1.18 addresses these questions for the first
time. 138  Because prospective clients do have a legitimate interest in
confidentiality, 139 the rule attempts to reach a compromise by offering
some protection while not automatically disqualifying the attorney or
the attorney's firm from representing the current client. The rule states
that a lawyer shall not represent a client with interests materially
adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially
related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective
client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter,
unless 1) both the affected client and the prospective client give
informed written consent or 2) the lawyer who received the information
took reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying
information than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to
represent the prospective client, the lawyer is timely screened from any
participation in the matter, the lawyer is apportioned no part of the fee,
and the prospective client is given prompt written notice. 140
Unfortunately, there is a problematic aspect of the Model Rule and a
rather troubling detail about the proposed rule in Illinois. As stated
above, the Model Rule attempts to strike a balance between protecting
138. One issue that is not addressed specifically by the rule relates to the question of whether
an attorney has a duty to advise about, or help in, getting new representation for the prospective
client. The rule also does not address its possible implications regarding tort liability, which is
understandable because the rule is not designed to deal with those.
139. Rule 1.18(b) states the well settled proposition that information learned from a
prospective client is confidential and that the attorney has a duty to protect it just as much as any
other confidential information provided by a former client. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
31, at 381. In fact, this principle had already been expressed by the ABA Committee on
Professional Responsibility in 1990 in Formal Ethics Opinion 90-358 in which it concluded that
information given to a lawyer by a prospective client is protected from disclosure under Model
Rule 1.6 even if the lawyer does not undertake the representation. ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-358 (1990).
140. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18 (2003).
20081
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the rights of the prospective client and the ability of the firm to continue
to represent, or to accept future representation of, a client with interests
adverse to those of the prospective client. Part of this balance is based
on the suggestion that a lawyer should not be allowed to represent an
adverse interest to that of the former prospective client only if the
information obtained from this person could be "significantly harmful"
to him or her. 14 1  Thus, presumably, an attorney would not be
disqualified from representing a client against a former prospective
client if the information received from the latter was merely harmful.
The problem is that there is no clear way to determine the difference
between significantly harmful information and just plain harmful
information. In fact, in the context of a motion to disqualify, it would
be difficult for a court to make that determination without knowing the
information or the theory of the case that arguably makes the
information relevant and harmful. 142
The Model Rule also seeks to strike a balance between the firm's and
the prospective client's interests by requiring that the law firm inform
the prospective client of the representation adverse to the prospective
client's interest and of the existence of a screening system. Presumably
this provides some assurance to the prospective client that the firm has a
mechanism in place to protect his or her confidences. 143 The proposal
in Illinois eliminates this requirement. 144 According to this approach,
the prospective client does not have a right to object to the adverse
representation or even to receive notice of the potential conflict.
Finally, it should be noted that the proposed rule may have a
significant impact on solo practitioners who cannot establish a screening
mechanism, and therefore may be precluded from representing current
clients against prospective clients altogether. Thus, solo practitioners
must be extremely careful when interviewing prospective clients to
avoid disqualifying themselves from representing existing clients.
Whereas today it is the lawyer's responsibility to limit the amount of
information a prospective client shares, under the new rule, lawyers
practicing in a law firm would not have to worry as much about this
possible conflict as solo practitioners.
The key to the rule remains the definition of "prospective client."
Not every person who consults an attorney about a legal matter should
141. Id. R. 1.18(c).
142. ROTUNDA & DzIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 1.18-1(c), at 644.
143. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18(d)(2)(ii) (2003).
144. See ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18 (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/PublicHearings/2007/04-18.pdf.
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be considered a prospective client. Thankfully, the proposal in Illinois
includes the adoption of the comment to the Model Rule, which
provides the prevailing interpretation of the term. According to the
comment, a person who communicates information unilaterally to a
lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to
discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, is not a
"prospective client." 145
This definition is actually one of the most significant elements of the
new rule given the prevalence of the use of the internet to contact
attorneys. When firms offer anyone with access to the internet the
option to communicate with attorneys by e-mail, attorneys may receive
unsolicited messages with confidential information that could result in
the attorney's forced disqualification from representing existing clients.
Whether an unsolicited e-mail message creates an attorney/prospective
client relationship usually depends on the degree to which the attorney
invited or encouraged the message or gave the impression that the
attorney would attend to the sender's requests, which, in turn, usually
depends on the terms or appearance of the website or ad where the e-
mail contact information was provided. 146 To avoid misunderstandings,
lawyers are advised to place clear and prominent disclaimers on every
internet page in which they explain that unsolicited information sent
voluntarily by prospective clients will not be confidential. 147
C. Responsibilities of a Prosecutor and the Power to Subpoena
Attorneys
Rule 3.8 of the current Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct
provides a list of duties that apply specifically to prosecutors, including
a duty to seek justice, a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, and a
duty to refrain from making, and to prevent others from making, certain
types of extrajudicial statements. 148 The proposed new rule would add
a duty to protect an unrepresented accused's right to counsel 149 and
145. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18 cmt. 2 (2003).
146. See Wash. St. Bar. Ass'n, Informal Op. 2080 (2006) (stating that if a law firm uses a
website to solicit inquiries from prospective clients rather than just provide general information
about itself, it must treat their responses as confidential).
147. See Nev. Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 32 (2005) (holding that
if unsolicited communication is in response to lawyer's website or internet advertisement, lawyer
must take appropriate precautions such as warnings and disclaimers); Ariz. St. Bar Ass'n Ethics
Comm., Formal Op. 02-04 (2002) (holding that if firm's website includes e-mail address, website
should include disclaimer of confidentiality).
148. ILL. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007).
149. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b) (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Public-Hearings/2007/04-18.pdf. In sections (a)
20081
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suggests some minor changes to the language of the current rule.
150
However, the proposal would also add a controversial statement
regarding the authority of a prosecutor to subpoena other lawyers.
The controversy over this subpoena provision could itself be the
subject of a law review article, 151 but a short explanation should suffice
to understand it. As approved in 1983, the original Model Rules did not
contain a provision regulating the authority of prosecutors to subpoena
lawyers. In 1990, however, the rules were amended to place limits on
this practice by requiring judicial approval after an opportunity for an
adversarial hearing before a subpoena could be issued. 152 In 1991, the
Illinois Supreme Court adopted this new version of the rule, but
abandoned it just a year later because of objections by prosecutors. 153
The ABA also dropped the provision from its Model Rules in 1995 on
the theory that it belonged in a rule of criminal procedure rather than in
an ethics code. 154
Since then, prosecutors continue to use the practice of subpoenaing
attorneys with increasing frequency. 155 Prosecutors often want access
to information about fees paid to criminal defense counsel to determine
if the fees are subject to forfeiture. Defense attorneys try to resist the
subpoenas to protect their clients' confidential information and have
through (d), the rule states the duty of prosecutors to guard for other rights of the accused. Id. R.
3.8(a)-(d).
150. For example, the rule limits its application to prosecutors by eliminating references to
"other government lawyers." Id.
151. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, A Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas
of Attorneys, 76 MINN. L. REV. 917, 919 (1992) (suggesting that "opening the grand jury to
clients of attorney-witnesses would help secure attorney-client relationships without damaging
the grand jury's traditional investigative role"); Thomas D. Morgan, An Introduction to the
Debate Over Fee Forfeitures, 36 EMORY L.J. 755, 757 (1987) (discussing whether attorneys' fees
paid with the indirect or direct proceeds of a crime may, under federal law, be subject to forfeiture
if the defendant is convicted).
152. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 3.8-2(d), at 732.
153. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 30-31.
154. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 3.8-2(d), at 733; see also Baylson v.
Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 975 F.2d 102, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1992)
(finding that a local rule regulating a subpoena practice exceeded the court's rulemaking
authority); CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. B. ASS'N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 376 (6th ed. 2007) (citing A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 31, at
511-12).
155. During the 1980s, the federal government subpoenaed attorneys in approximately ten to
thirty-two percent of the criminal cases in the District of Massachusetts. ROTUNDA &
DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 3.8-2(d), at 731 (citing United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649,
658 (1st Cir. 1987), aff'd en banc, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987)).
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argued that the government abuses its authority in order to intimidate or
retaliate against successful defense attorneys. 156
Seven years after it abandoned the subpoena provision in Model Rule
3.8, the ABA re-instituted a new version when it adopted the current
rule. The Model Rule holds that a prosecutor shall not subpoena a
lawyer to present evidence about his or her clients or former clients
unless the prosecutor reasonably believes that the information sought is
not protected by privilege and is essential to the prosecution or
investigation and unless there is no other feasible alternative to obtain
the information. 157 The new rule does not include the old requirement
of judicial approval and opportunity for a hearing before a prosecutor
can subpoena a lawyer to question him or her about current or past
clients. The ISBA/CBA Joint Committee and the Supreme Court
Committee on Professional Responsibility agreed to endorse the new
proposed rule arguing that the new provision is significantly different
than the one rejected in 1992 because it limits prosecutorial subpoenas
to situations where the information sought is essential, not privileged
and not accessible otherwise1 58 and "that removal of the court
order/adversarial hearing requirement should make the rule more
palatable for prosecutors, and that the subpoena provision is otherwise
appropriate."' 159
V. MISSED OPPORTUNITIES: CHANGES THAT ARE NOT BEING PROPOSED
Although the proposed new rules address some very important issues,
there are many others that are ignored. In the next few sections these
missed opportunities are addressed.
A. The Requirement of Written Consent for Conflicts of Interest
As a result of the proposals of the Ethics 2000 Commission, the
Model Rules now require that attorneys obtain a client's consent to a
156. Steven Duke, The Drug War on the Constitution (Oct. 5, 1999), http://www.cato.org/
realaudio/drugwar/papers/duke.html (lamenting the characterization of defense attorneys as
"enemies" in the "war on drugs"); see also William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK.
L. REV. 781, 840-41 (1988) (arguing that a prosecutor has no legitimate interest in increasing the
likelihood of obtaining a conviction by creating restrictions on a defendant's right to counsel and
suggesting that sometimes the true motive is to deny the prospective defendant representation by
the attorney of choice).
157. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e) (2003).
158. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 30-31; see also Letter from
Richard A. Redmond, supra note 4, Exhibit B (showing the ISBA/CBA and the Illinois Supreme
Court Committee as adopting proposed Rule 3.8).
159. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 31.
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conflict of interest in writing. 160 If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit
the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, the lawyer
must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time. 161 The purpose of
this new requirement is to "impress upon clients the seriousness of the
decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or
ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing." 162
Though this requirement appears to be a good idea, the proposed new
Illinois Rules explicitly reject it. The ISBA/CBA Joint Committee
explains its position in its report, stating that:
The model rule requires waivers of conflicts (i.e., client consents) to
be in writing. That would be a significant change from the current
Illinois rule. Although written conflict waivers are clearly desirable in
many situations, requiring written consent in every situation as a
matter of discipline is both unnecessary and inappropriate. Often, the
conflict issues are clear, the affected clients understand the issues, and
the matter is uncomplicated. The need for consent may arise
unexpectedly and without notice in the midst of a transaction or other
matter. In such cases, requiring a writing merely adds unnecessary
delay and expense, and elevates technicality over the substantive
question whether consent was given. Moreover, subjecting a lawyer to
potential discipline, disqualification, and malpractice liability for want
of a writing-when it may be entirely clear that the consent was in
fact given-is not reasonable. Accordingly, the Committee
recommends that the rule and comments be revised to eliminate the
requirement that conflict waivers be in writing. 163
This view seems to be based on the notion that an attorney would be
subject to discipline if the attorney does not get the client to sign a
waiver the moment the conflict arises. Yet the comment to the Model
Rule is clear that this is not a requirement; rather, the most important
thing is that the attorney communicate with the client carefully about
the possible conflict. 164
160. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.11, 1.12, 3.7 cmt 6 (2003).
161. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 20.
162. Id.
163. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 16.
164. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 20 (2003). "Confirmed in writing" is
defined as follows:
"Confirmed in writing," when used in reference to the informed consent of a person,
denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person or a writing that a
lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent .... If it
is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed
consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.
Id. R. 1.0(b).
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Requiring consent in writing essentially forces the attorney to talk to
his or her client about the issue. Presumably, the attorney would want
to take the time to explain to the client the consequences of the
document he or she is asking the client to sign. As stated in the
comment to Model Rule 1.7:
The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases
for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and
advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of
interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the
client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives
and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in
order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client
is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might
later occur in the absence of a writing. 16
Because there is no requirement that an attorney drop everything the
moment the need for consent arises unexpectedly or in the midst of a
transaction, it does not seem unreasonable to require written consent.
For this reason, the requirement of a written waiver need not add
unnecessary delays or much expense. On the other hand, it may
enhance the required attention both attorney and client would give to the
discussion of the issue.
B. Pro Bono Service
The ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission seriously considered adopting a
rule that imposed a duty of mandatory pro bono service but ultimately
rejected the idea.166 The Model Rule that was approved essentially
states that all lawyers are expected to perform pro bono services but
does not require it. 167 The comment to the rule also makes clear that
non-compliance with the rule cannot be enforced through the
disciplinary process. 168 The rule is merely aspirational. For this reason,
Illinois does not currently have a similar rule. 169 The ISBA/CBA Joint
165. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 20.
166. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 6.1-2(b), at 911-12. This discussion is not
new. One of the original drafts of the Model Rules prepared by the Kutak Commission included
a mandatory duty to perform pro bono work. In fact, since the ABA started to draft model
professional responsibility codes and rules, there has been a debate as to whether there ought to
be a rule mandating pro bono service. Every time, however, it was ultimately decided not to
make pro bono service a mandated requirement.
167. Model Rule 6.1 states that a lawyer "should aspire" to render fifty hours of pro bono
publico legal services every year. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2003).
168. Id. R. 6.1 cmt. 12.
169. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 35 (citing GEORGE W.
OVERTON, THE NEW ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, AN ANNOTATED EDITION 28
(1991)).
20081
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Committee has suggested that the current Model Rule not be adopted,
stating that "[t]he model rule articulates praiseworthy goals and
aspirations for a lawyer, but aspirations are not appropriate subjects of a
disciplinary rule." 170
Although the Committee is correct that the Model Rule is
aspirational, it is a mistake to leave the rule out. Encouraging attorneys
to provide pro bono services is an important goal, and the Model Rule
would do just that. 171 It serves as a reminder of the importance of pro
bono service and as an exhortation to attorneys to get involved. While
the rule is not meant to be enforced through the disciplinary process,
this is not the only rule that fits that description. If the logic of the
ISBA/CBA Joint Committee's report were to be followed strictly, many
other discretionary rules should be eliminated as well, including some
of the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality and the rules suggesting
the circumstances where an attorney can decline or terminate the
representation of a client. As clearly explained in the Scope section of
the Model Rules:
Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall
not." These define proper conduct for purposes of professional
discipline. Others, generally cast in the term "may," are permissive
and define areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has professional
discretion. No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer
chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such discretion.172
Regardless of whether the Model Rule is adopted, the Committee's
recommendation to amend the Preamble of the Rules to include the
portions of the current Illinois Rules Preamble addressing pro bono
service should be implemented. However, the Preamble should also
170. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 35.
171. Rule 6.1, comment 1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct states:
Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a
responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal
involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding
experiences in the life of a lawyer. The American Bar Association urges all lawyers to
provide a minimum of 50 hours of pro bono services annually. States, however, may
decide to choose a higher or lower number of hours of annual service (which may be
expressed as a percentage of a lawyer's professional time) depending upon local needs
and local conditions. It is recognized that in some years a lawyer may render greater or
fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of his or her legal
career, each lawyer should render on average per year, the number of hours set forth in
this Rule.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 cmt. 1 (2003).
172. Id. at Scope cmt. 14 (emphasis added).
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mention Supreme Court Rule 756(f), which now requires lawyers to
report all pro bono activity every year.173
C. The Problem of Attempting to Regulate "Extrajudicial Speech"
The proposed new Illinois Rules suggest maintaining current Rule
3.6, which limits the right of attorneys to make statements about
ongoing litigation in circumstances when the attorney "knows or
reasonably should know" that the statement "will be disseminated by
means of public communication and would pose a serious and imminent
threat to the fairness of an adjudicative proceeding in the matter."' 174
This formulation is better than that adopted by the ABA in its version of
Model Rule 3.6, which, as the ISBA/CBA Joint Committee Report
correctly states, may be more restrictive of attorney speech. 17 5
However, considering the debate regarding the constitutionality of
these types of rules, the first question is whether it is a good idea to
continue to approach the issue of extrajudicial speech through
professional regulation. It would be worthwhile to consider eliminating
the rule entirely.
There is no question that states have a substantial interest in making
sure trials are fair, and that attorneys have an obligation to make sure
that their conduct does not prejudice the administration of justice.
States also have an interest in protecting public confidence in the
judicial system, protecting the integrity of the process, ensuring
decisions are based on the arguments and facts at trial, and ensuring that
attorneys do not increase administrative costs by forcing changes in
173. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 756(f) (2008). The rule defines pro bono legal service as the delivery of
legal services without charge or expectation of a fee to a person of limited means or to charitable,
religious, civic, community, governmental or educational organizations in matters designed to
address the needs of persons of limited means, or to charitable, religious, civic, or community
organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes. Id. The rule also
considers pro bono services the provision of training, without charge or expectation of a fee,
intended to benefit legal service organizations or lawyers who provide pro bono services. Id.
Legal services for which payment was expected, but is uncollectible, do not qualify as pro bono
legal service. Id. It has been argued that the mandating reporting of pro bono work is more
effective than mandating pro bono service itself. See Lisa Boyle, Meeting the Demands of the
Indigent Population: The Choice Between Mandatory and Voluntary Pro Bono Requirements, 20
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 415, 415 (2007). The constitutionality of a mandatory reporting statute
has been questioned, but in Schwarz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387 (1 1th Cir. 1998), the court decided
that a mandatory reporting statute was constitutional and that a lawyer could be disciplined for
failing to report. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note I, § 6.1-2(b), at 912.
174. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/PublicHearings/2007/04-18.pdf.
175. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 29. The ABA Model Rule bans
statements that will have a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2003).
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venue, extensive voir dire or sequestration of juries to counter the
effects of their speech. Yet, the question remains whether these
interests weigh in favor of imposing restrictions on attorney speech.
This balancing may depend on whether the state interests are so
threatened by attorney speech that the regulation chosen to advance
those interests is justified. The fundamental rationale for the rules is
that extrajudicial trial publicity, specifically attorney speech, can be
especially prejudicial in adjudicative proceedings. Yet, the evidence
suggesting that attorney speech can have this effect is conflicting or
inconclusive. 176
Because there is no conclusive evidence that extrajudicial statements
can cause prejudice, the application of rules attempting to limit the
effect of those statements becomes problematic. The rules seek to
preserve fairness in the process at the expense of an attorney's ethical
obligation to zealously represent a client. 177  They also affect the
attorney's First Amendment rights of expression and interfere with the
public's right to be informed about matters of public concern. Although
the rules prohibit statements that lawyers know or should know could be
prejudicial, there is little evidence that any statements are indeed
prejudicial. Attorneys attempting to comply with the rules would
rarely, if ever, be able to know the effect of the statements. This could
result in a chilling effect on presumptively protected speech.
The alternative is to eliminate the rule altogether and emphasize the
courts' inherent power to regulate the conduct of attorneys who practice
before them. This way judges could consider the specific facts and
circumstances of each particular case and issue narrowly tailored
guidelines giving attorneys a fair warning as to what would be allowed.
Assuming the rule is not eliminated, there is another objection to how
it is drafted. The rule states that:
A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation
or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by
means of public communication and would pose a serious and
176. For a detailed discussion of this issue, including a discussion of empirical studies on the
effect of extrajudicial publicity on jurors, see generally Alberto Bernabe, Silence is Golden: The
New Illinois Rules on Attorney Extrajudicial Speech, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 323 (2002).
177. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1043 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(Justice Kennedy's opinion supporting the view that, by virtue of their involvement in a case and
their training as advocates, attorneys are frequently the most appropriate persons to speak
publicly on behalf of a client); see also FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 60, at 104-05.
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imminent threat to the fairness of an adjudicative proceeding in the
matter. 
178
Although the drafters of the proposed new Illinois rules suggest that a
lawyer "should rarely be subjected to discipline for what he or she
should have known," 179 proposed Illinois Rule 3.6 retains the possibility
of discipline based on what a lawyer "should know." 180  This is
surprising because the use of the "should know" or "should have
known" standard in Rule 3.6 is questionable. As applied, the rule does
not refer to knowing what a competent attorney should know but to
knowing what a person outside the attorney's control would know.
If Illinois decides to keep the "should have known standard" in this
rule, the rule should be changed from stating that a lawyer "shall not
make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know will be disseminated by means of public communication
and would pose a serious and imminent threat to the fairness of an
adjudicative proceeding in the matter" to "shall not make an
extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows will be disseminated by
means of public communication and knows or reasonably should know
that the statement would pose a serious and imminent threat to the
fairness of an adjudicative proceeding in the matter." This way, the
rules would not require a lawyer to anticipate what someone beyond his
or her control would do with the information, and any possible
discipline would be based on an evaluation of the attorney's own
conduct.
D. Reporting Another Attorney's Misconduct
According to both the Model Rules and the current Illinois Rules, a
lawyer is obligated to report another lawyer's misconduct when the
lawyer knows of the other lawyer's violation of a rule that raises a
substantial question as to honesty and fitness to practice law. 181
However, the Model Rule does not allow disclosures of confidential
information, while the current Illinois Rule does. This difference is the
178. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Public-Hearings/2007/04-18.pdf.
179. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 18. The report adds that "[t]he
rules are intended primarily to instruct lawyers how to behave, and it is impossible to act upon
what one does not know." Id.
180. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Public-Hearings/2007/04-18.pdf.
181. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2007); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
8.3 (2003).
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result of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in In re Himmel.182 Its
consequence is that attorneys in Illinois have a broader obligation to
report than attorneys in all other jurisdictions. The proposed new rules
for Illinois do not alter this fact.
With In re Himmel, Illinois became the first state to impose discipline
based solely on a lawyer's failure to report another lawyer's
misconduct. 183 In doing so, the court interpreted the duty much more
broadly than intended by the ABA. In Himmel, the attorney in question
had obtained confidential, but not privileged, information that his
client's previous lawyer had converted client's funds. 184  Instead of
reporting the conduct to the authorities, the attorney negotiated a
settlement in exchange for a promise not to disclose the misconduct.1 85
The main problem with the decision of the court in Himme 1186 is that
the court found a duty to report even though the attorney obtained his
knowledge of the misconduct through confidential information. When
the Illinois Rules were adopted some time later, they copied the text of
the Model Rules which excepted from disclosure "information protected
as a confidence" 187 but defined "confidence" as information protected
by the attorney-client privilege. 188 Because this is a much narrower
category of information, the end result is that, in Illinois, the rule
mandates disclosure in many more circumstances.
Interestingly, thus far, other states have not followed the Illinois
Supreme Court's lead. 189 The Committees that prepared the proposal
for the new Illinois Rules should not have either. Instead, and without
much explanation, they simply suggest that imposing a duty to disclose
confidential, but not privileged, information must be a good policy
essentially because the Illinois Supreme Court has so held. The end
result is that the proposed rule is very similar to the current one,190
182. In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 794.
185. Id. at791.
186. For a discussion of some of the problems with the decision in Himmel, see ROTUNDA &
DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 8.3-1, at 1074, to § 8.3-2, at 1082.
187. ILL. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2007).
188. Id.
189. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, § 8.3-1(b), at 1178.
190. The ISBA/CBA Joint Committee report summarizes its suggestions for the rule by
stating that the text of the Model Rule should be adopted, except that:
(1) Current Illinois law concerning the type of violation that must be reported should
be retained; (2) current Illinois law limiting the exception to the reporting duty to
privileged information should be retained; (3) Comment [4] should be supplemented to
clarify that a lawyer consulted in a professional capacity by another lawyer concerning
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which means that it mandates disclosure of more information and under
more circumstances than the ABA Model Rule, and quite possibly more
than any other rule in any other state. 19 1 Whether this is a good idea
depends on whether the threat of discipline for non-disclosure is
resulting in more prosecutions for unethical or unprofessional conduct
that would otherwise go undiscovered. Mary Robinson, former
Administrator of the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission, has argued that this is indeed the case, stating that
"lawyers faced with potential disciplinary exposure make prompt
reports, and . . . that promptness makes it possible for discipline to
intervene more swiftly and limit the potential damage that might be
done by the offending lawyer." 192
More importantly, the rules do not address when the report must be
made. In In re Himmel, the attorney argued that he did not report
because it was actually in the best interest of the client. 193 Even in such
a case, it is clearly not acceptable to fail to report, but would it be
acceptable to delay the disclosure until a point in time when doing so
would not affect the client? If so, what would be an acceptable amount
of time? There seems to be a variety of approaches to this question, 194
and the rule should specifically address it.
the second lawyer's obligation to report does not thereby incur a reporting obligation;
and (4) a requirement to notify the ARDC of disciplinary action by other authorities
should be added to the rule, or, if a separate proposal for a new Supreme Court Rule
761A is adopted, a cross reference to that rule should be added to a comment.
ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 39.
191. The ABA Model Rules require that attorneys report another lawyer's violation of a rule
that "raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2003). In contrast, the
Illinois rule would require a lawyer to report "a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects" and "conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a)
(2007).
192. Mary T. Robinson, A Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Misconduct: The
Illinois Experience, 2007 SYMP. ISSUE OF PROF. LAW. 3 (on file with author).
193. In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 791-93 (I11. 1988).
194. Compare Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Formal Op. 1990-3 (1990) (stating
that reporting must be prompt but some delay may be warranted to protect client's interests), with
In re Anderson, 769 A.2d 1282 (Vt. 2000) (holding that nine months was too long to wait to
report), and United States v. Cantor, 897 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that reporting
must be within reasonable time under the circumstances). See also Joanne P. Pitulla, Should
Clients Be Able to Veto the Duty to Report?, PROF. LAW., August 1996, at 2 (arguing that the
duty of client confidentiality should not trump the duty to report).
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E. Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents and Confidential Information
Proposed new Illinois Rule 4.4(b) states that a lawyer who receives a
document relating to the representation of a client that the lawyer knows
was inadvertently sent should promptly notify the sender. 195 It is
interesting to note that the rule does not impose a duty to return the
document or to refrain from reading it. The comment to the rule states
that unless there is applicable law that requires the lawyer to return the
document, the decision to return it is a matter of professional judgment
and personal choice. 196
This new addition to the Illinois Rules can be improved by
addressing issues arising out of the practice of transmitting digital
documents, which increases the risk of inadvertent disclosure of
confidential information. 197  State bar association ethics opinions in
New York and Florida have essentially taken the position that any
embedded data in digital documents is to be considered by the receiving
lawyer as confidential information that the sending lawyer did not
intend to transmit. 198 In contrast, the ABA Committee on Professional
Responsibility concluded in a recent formal opinion that the Rules "do
not contain any specific prohibition against a lawyer's reviewing and
using embedded information in electronic documents."1 99 The ABA's
195. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Public-Hearings/2007/04-18.pdf. This is a slightly
different version of ABA Model Rule 4.4(b), which holds the same thing but imposes the same
duty if the attorney "should have known" that the document was sent by mistake. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2003) (containing a "should have known" standard).
196. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) cmt. 3 (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/PublicHearings/2007/04-18.pdf. The comment also
suggests that whether the disclosure eliminates the privileged status of the document depends on
the law of evidence. It should be noted that there is support for the proposition that if the
evidentiary privilege is lost, the receiving attorney can take advantage of the mistake. In fact,
some would argue that if the privilege is lost by the inadvertent disclosure, the lawyer who
receives the information not only can but should read and use the information to his or her
client's advantage. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 102 reporters'
note cmt. e (2000) (stating that "[i]f the disclosure operates to end legal protection for the
information, the lawyer may use it for the benefit of the lawyer's own client and may be required
to do so if that would advance the client's lawful objectives").
197. See generally David Hricik, Mining for Metadata: Is it Ethical to Take Intentional
Advantage of Other People's Failures?, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH 231 (2007) (discussing the
transmittal of digital documents).
198. See Prof'I Ethics of the Florida Bar, Op. 06-2 (2006) (detailing Florida's position
regarding embedded data in digital documents); New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l
Ethics, Op. 749 (2001) (discussing New York's position).
199. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006).
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opinion has been criticized, and several states have adopted different
views. 200
Whether the duties (and the consequences for their violation) should
fall on the sender of the document, on the recipient, or on both of them
is a complex topic, and its importance will increase even more as the
distribution of documents digitally becomes more common. It thus
seems prudent to consider this issue as part of the process of
modernizing the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.
F. Imputed Disqualification and Screening
When Illinois adopted its current rule regarding imputed
disqualification due to conflicts of interest, it rejected the then-
applicable Model Rule and became one of a minority of states that
recognize the practice of screening attorneys within a law firm.20 1
Having allowed this practice for years, the ISBA/CBA Joint Committee
has taken the position that eliminating the screening provision from the
Illinois rules "would be a fundamental step backwards."20 2 While it
would be difficult to argue that it should be abandoned, it is worthwhile
to examine some arguments in support of taking that step.
The problem arises when an attorney leaves a firm to join a new firm
that represents a client with interests adverse to those of a client the
attorney previously represented in the original firm. This former client
of the attorney has a right to expect a certain level of loyalty from the
attorney, which is protected by Model Rule 1.9.203 According to Model
Rule 1.9, if the attorney joining the firm possesses relevant confidential
200. Hricik, supra note 196, at 238-42; John Levin, What to do with Metadata, CBA
RECORD, June/July 2007, at 68 (arguing that New York and Alabama have a better approach to
the problem).
201. Aside from Illinois, only Arizona, Deleware, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Utah, and Washington allow screening. SUSAN MARTYN, LAWRENCE Fox & W. BRADLEY
WENDEL, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, NATIONAL RULES, STANDARDS, STATUTES AND
STATE LAWYER CODES 120-23 (2006-2007).
202. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 19; see also Creamer & Luning,
supra note 5, at 308 ("Model Rule 1.10, dealing with imputation of conflicts, does not allow
screening of a lateral entrant to a firm to prevent disqualification of the entire firm. That would
be a step backward for Illinois, where screening has operated well since 1990, with no evidence
of harm to clients.").
203. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c) (2000) ("A lawyer who has formerly
represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client
in a matter shall not thereafter: (1) use information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage of the former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a
client, or when the information has become generally known; or (2) reveal information relating to
the representation except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client.")
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information, the firm he or she joins will be disqualified from
representing a client with interests adverse to those of the client left
behind. 204 The issue hinges on whether the attorney acquired relevant
confidential information while in the original firm.
According to the Model Rules, the new firm must show that the
attorney did not acquire confidential information while in the previous
firm. Otherwise, the attorney's new firm is disqualified. In contrast,
the current approach in Illinois allows the new firm to continue to
represent its client even if the new attorney who joined the firm has
relevant confidential information, as long as he or she is screened from
all participation in the representation. 20
5
The endorsement of screening sets Illinois apart from other states and
has generated a spirited debate among commentators. Defenders of the
current approach allowing screening assert that the underlying argument
against screening is simply the notion that you "can't trust attorneys" to
comply with their duty to keep confidences and not get involved in the
case while in the new firm, which they say is at least ironic, if not
insulting.20 6  They also argue that there is no evidence from states
allowing screening showing an increase in client complaints because of
the practice.20 7 As stated by one commentator:
In the real world, . . . actual cases of lateral lawyers disclosing
confidential information about former clients to their new firms are
nonexistent. While some clients may be upset to learn that "their
lawyer," or more commonly a lawyer who formerly worked on a
204. ABA Model Rule 1.9 states:
A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously
represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and about
whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is
material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in
writing.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(b) (2003). This duty extends to everyone in the new
firm. Id. R. 1.10.
205. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2007).
206. Robert Creamer, Three Myths About Lateral Screening, PROF. LAW., winter 2002, at 20;
Erin Cohn, The Use of Screens to Cure Imputed Conflicts of Interest: Why The American Bar
Association's and Most State Bar Associations' Failure to Allow Screening Undermines the
Integrity of the Legal Profession, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 367, 378 (2006) (discussing fears that
lawyers will not effectively self-regulate themselves).
207. Creamer, supra note 206, at 21. In 1999, the Administrator of the Illinois Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission stated in a letter to the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission
that in almost nine years since the use of screening was allowed in Illinois, there had been "no
formal cases involving charges that an effort to screen under Rule 1. 10 was inadequate to protect
confidential information." Id.; see also Creamer & Luning, supra note 5, at 308 (arguing that
screening has operated since 1990 with no evidence of harm to clients).
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matter handled by the firm that represents the client, has joined a law
firm that represents an adverse party, there is no hard evidence that
such clients have suffered any real harm. In fact, evidence presented
to the [ABA Ethics 2000] Commission ... from lawyer disciplinary
authorities in states that have long permitted lateral screening
confirmed that there have been virtually no complaints of harm to
former clients of lateral lawyers who have been screened.208
Furthermore, supporters of screening point out that disqualification of
the new firm is unfair to that finn's client, who loses his or her attorney
of choice when the client did not do anything to deserve it.20 9 They also
argue that prohibiting screening makes it difficult for attorneys to seek
new jobs and move to new firms 210 and that the Model Rules are
inconsistent because they allow screening when an attorney joins a
private firm after having worked for the government.211  The
ISBA/CBA Joint Committee Report essentially adopts these positions,
stating:
A significant deficiency in Model Rule 1.10 is that it fails to allow
screening of a lateral entrant to a firm in order to avoid the
disqualification of the entire firm .... Screening has operated well for
many years, without any indication of abuse or of harm to clients. It
properly balances the interests of former clients in confidentiality, the
interests of current clients in hiring counsel of their choice, and the
interests of lawyers in mobility . . . . Accordingly, the Committee
recommends that Illinois retain a screening provision. 212
On the other hand, the argument in support of abandoning the current
approach in Illinois is compelling. 2 13 Some argue that it is difficult to
trust screening as an effective method to protect the interests of former
clients against the risk of disclosure of confidential information.2 14
Screening allows firms to avoid a conflict based on the firm's word,
208. Creamer, supra note 206, at 21.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. In fact, the Model Rules do allow screening in the context of attorneys moving from a
government position to a private law firm under Model Rules 1.11 and 1.12 and to protect the
interests of a prospective client under Model Rule 1.18. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.1 1, 1.12, 1.18 (2003).
212. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMIFEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 18-19.
213. In fact, the argument is so compelling that it convinced the ABA House of Delegates to
reject the Ethics 2000 Commission's recommendation to amend the Model Rules to allow
screening in August 2001. Creamer, supra note 205, at 20.
214. See Lawrence J. Fox, Ethics 2000: Is It Good For Clients?, PROF. LAW., Spring 2001, at
17, 20 ("Clients should have as much confidence in these screens protecting their confidential
information as those who live in New Orleans have in real screens preventing the torrid summer
heat from entering their homes.").
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which the client cannot prove wrong. As one noted commentator
explains, imposing screening on clients does not foster client trust
because it:
... ignores client interests entirely .... [T]he client is simply told that
... she should not worry because that person has been "screened." No
longer is the client presented with the conflict of interest situation and
asked whether she will waive the conflict, with the lawyer agreeing to
abide [sic] the client's decision .... Rather this screening is presented
to the innocent client as a fait accompli.215
Additionally, although there is no evidence to suggest problems in
jurisdictions that allow screening, this may be because the client would
never know if there is a violation of the screen. Opponents of screening
argue that it is too much to ask a client to accept on faith the
effectiveness of the screening without any way to verify it.216
Finally, there is the question of whether screening actually works.
Many think of screening as a practice that affects one attorney, which is
easy to manage. The reality might be quite different. Firms may have
to establish multiple screens of multiple lawyers and multiple clients.
One commentator has argued that the ability to keep track of such
screens, let alone enforce them, is dubious at best.217
In addition, the fact that the rules allow screening when an attorney
moves from public service to private practice and in cases of
prospective clients should not necessarily result in the recognition of
screening in other contexts. The rule allowing screening for former
government lawyers is based on the idea that lawyers should not be
discouraged from seeking employment in the public sector for fear of
being unable to seek jobs in private law firms later.218 This public
policy does not apply when the attorney attempts to move from one
private law firm to another. It has been argued that "cases are rare
where someone could not find good employment while respecting our
rules governing loyalty."2 19
Moreover, screening to protect the confidences of a prospective client
presents its own set of questions. As discussed previously, currently it
is the attorney's responsibility to be careful when interviewing a
prospective client to make sure that the prospective client's interests are
215. Id. at 19.
216. Id. at 20 ("It is clearly asking too much for the client to accept on faith the effectiveness
of screening when there is no way the client will ever be able to determine whether there has been
compliance.").
217. Id.
218. Id. at 19.
219. Id.
[Vol. 39
New Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct
protected and that the attorney preserves the possibility of representing
a party with interests adverse to those of the prospective client. The
proposed rules in Illinois shift this responsibility to the prospective
client, and the firm does not even have to inform the prospective
client.220 The prospective client cannot object and must accept the
effectiveness of the screen on faith.221
In sum, abandoning the practice of screening in Illinois would
certainly turn back the clock, but it would not necessarily be a step
backward. In fact, it can be argued that it would be a step in the right
direction.
Regardless of whether the screening provision is retained or
abandoned, the proposed Illinois Rule is different from the Model Rule
in another important detail. As stated above, to decide a motion to
disqualify, the court would have to determine if the attorney has
acquired confidential information. The Model Rules presume that the
attorney acquired confidential information while working at the first
firm and, thus, impose the burden of proof that the attorney did not do
so on the firm whose disqualification is sought.222  The proposed
Illinois Rules reject this approach and state that the burden should fall
on the party seeking disqualification. 223
This is a difficult question and neither approach is perfect, but the
proposed approach in Illinois seems to be better. If the burden is on the
firm whose disqualification is sought, the firm must prove that the
attorney did not have confidential information. This can be shown by
providing the attorney's own testimony and evidence of the original
firm's practices and records. This last type of evidence, however, is in
the hands of the firm that now represents an opponent trying to get
access to the evidence. On the other hand, if the burden is on the party
seeking disqualification, this party must prove that the attorney had
access to confidential information. To do so, it has available the records
and practices of its own firm, which would be easier to produce.
G. Obligation to Take Remedial Measures After Using False Evidence
The proposed rules suggest a number of changes to issues related to
the duty of candor to the tribunal, but miss the chance to explain when
the duty begins. Current Illinois Rule 3.3 collects a number of duties
220. Id. at 20.
221. Id.
222. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 6 (2003).
223. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 18 (citing Schwartz v.
Cortelloni, 685 N.E.2d 871 (I11. 1997)).
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related to the duty of candor toward a tribunal, including the duty to not
make false statements of fact or law and the duty to take remedial action
when the attorney knows that a witness, including his or her client, has
engaged in perjury. 224 Proposed Rule 3.3 would institute a number of
important changes to the current rule.225 For example, it would clarify
certain aspects of the lawyer's duty, including specifying when it is
necessary to take corrective action and what such action might be. The
proposed rule also provides that a lawyer may not refuse to offer
testimony of a defendant in a criminal case that the lawyer merely
believes, rather than knows, is false. 226  The proposed rule also
eliminates a number of items contained in the current rule because they
either restate obligations already mentioned in other rules or are more
properly the subject of substantive law or civil practice rules.227
Finally, the proposed rule sets a time limit on the duration of the
rectification obligation, which the ISBA/CBA Joint Committee Report
states is "a matter left indefinite in the current Illinois rule, which could
lead to a construction that the obligation exists forever." 228
All of these changes are appropriate. However, while establishing a
time limit for the duty to rectify to end, the rule fails to establish when
the duty begins. This is an important element because a lawyer's
mistake in understanding when the duty begins could form the basis for
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 229 If the attorney discloses
the client's intention to commit perjury too early, the duty of
confidentiality is compromised. 230 Also, until the defendant actually
takes the stand, there is hope that the attorney will be able to dissuade
the client from committing perjury and, thus, there is a chance that the
client will decide to testify truthfully. 2
31
224. ILL. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (2007).
225. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (Proposed Rules 2007), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/PublicHearings/2007/04-18.pdf.
226. Id. R. 3.3(a)(3).
227. They include the following subsections of the current Illinois Rule: 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, and 15. See ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 26-27.
228. Id. at 26.
229. See People v. Bartee, 566 N.E.2d 855, 856 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (outlining a situation in
which a defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel when the lawyer, after being denied
the ability to withdraw, allowed defendant to testify in narrative form).
230. An attorney that informs the court of his belief of possible perjury by his client "takes on
role of fact finder, a role which perverts structure of [an] adversary system." Id. (quoting United
States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 445 (8th Cir. 1988)). 0
231. See Bartee, 566 N.E.2d at 856 (citing the opinions of Justices Blackmun and Stevens in
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), in which they argued for limiting court notification of
possible perjury to "announced plans" to commit perjury because counsel's perceptions may be
incorrect, the client may more clearly recollect certain details that contradict prior recollections,
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For this reason, the new rule should give some guidance as to the
moment when the duty to disclose the client's intention to commit
perjury begins. Although it is clear that a mere suspicion that the
witness will commit perjury is not enough to trigger the duty to
disclose, 232 courts have developed varied approaches to this question.
Some courts hold that a clear expression of intent to commit perjury is
required before an attorney can reveal client confidences. 233  Others
suggest that there is a duty to disclose only if there is a "firm factual
basis" to believe the client is going to commit perjury.234 The Illinois
Court of Appeals, however, has decided that absent some showing that a
lawyer's decision was unreasonable under the circumstances, it cannot
be said that a defendant was denied a fair trial and, for that reason,
recognized a duty based on a "good faith determination" by the
attorney.235 The new rule should include this standard.
H. "Pay to Play"
The proposed Illinois Rules do not adopt Model Rule 7.6 which states
that a lawyer or law firm shall not accept a government legal
engagement or an appointment by a judge if the lawyer or law firm
makes a political contribution or solicits political contributions for the
purpose of obtaining or being considered for a legal engagement or
appointment.236 Although the Model Rule was enacted for a good
reason, 237 the rule creates more problems than it solves and it is a good
decision to exclude it.
and because "even a stated intent to perjure one's self does not necessarily mean that the client
will lie once sworn in on the stand").
232. Rule 3.3 suggests that an attorney has a duty to take remedial measures only if the
attorney has knowledge, which is more than a mere suspicion or belief. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2003); see also United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321, 326-27 (4th
Cir. 2003) (finding that a lawyer's "mere belief' that his client was not truthful was insufficient to
deny the defendant assistance in the presentation of his testimony). Note, however, that the
definition of knowledge in the Model Rules is not particularly helpful. Rule 1.0 states that
knowledge "denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2003).
233. See Shockley v. State, 565 A.2d 1373, 1379 (Del. 1989) (stating that a lawyer must have
evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that testimony will be perjured before she can
reveal client confidences).
234. United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 445-46 (8th Cir. 1988); Commonwealth v.
Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 1237, 1247 (Mass. 2003).
235. Bartee, 566 N.E.2d at 857 (applying a standard developed by the Supreme Court of
Illinois in People v. Flores, 538 N.E.2d 481 (1989)).
236. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.6 (2003).
237. As stated in an ABA work:
The practice commonly known as "pay-to-play" addressed by the Rule is a system
whereby lawyers and law firms are considered for or awarded government legal
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The ISBA/CBA Joint Committee Report summarizes the reasons to
reject the rule convincingly this way:
The Committee's recommendation is not an endorsement of so-called
"pay-to-play" practices addressed by the model rule. Such practices
are reprehensible and should not be tolerated. However, the attempt to
regulate them in a disciplinary rule is misplaced and raises substantial
enforceability and constitutionality concerns.
The ABA adopted this model rule in February 2000, after initially
rejecting it six months earlier, and after publicity about "pay-to-play"
practices by investment bankers, financial advisers, and lawyers,
principally in New York. The rule has not been adopted in Illinois, or
in most other states, for good reason. There are real issues of
enforceability. How does the ARDC divine the purpose of a lawyer's
political contribution? The problem is demonstrated by the intricate
"guidance" in Comment [5]. There is also concern about the possible
chilling effect on lawyers making political contributions in
circumstances where their motives are pure. In addition, real issues of
constitutionality exist. Contributions to political campaigns are
equated with speech and are accorded the highest level of First
Amendment protection. Finally, there is an issue whether the rule is
necessary. Rule 7.2(b) prohibits a lawyer giving anything of value to
a person for recommending the lawyer's services, and existing statutes
deal with bribery.238
Probably for similar reasons, few jurisdictions have adopted Rule 7.6
and one member of the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission has called it
the most decisively rejected rule and a "most brilliant mistake. 239 The
possible application of the rule turns on the motive behind the
contribution which is difficult to prove, to say the least. The rule is
essentially unenforceable. 240
engagements or appointments by a judge only upon their making or soliciting
contributions for the political campaigns of officials who are in a position to "steer"
such business their way.
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 31, at 785.
238. ISBA/CBA JOINT COMMrrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 37.
239. Lucian Pera, Grading ABA Leadership on Legal Ethics Leadership: State Adoption of the
Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 637, 818 (2005);
see also Brian C. Buescher, ABA Model Rule 7.6: The ABA Pleases the SEC, But Does Not Solve
Pay to Play, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 139 (2000) (proposing to shift the burden to attorneys
who have made campaign donations in potential "pay to play" situations).
240. John H. Beisner, Matthew Shors & Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action Cops: Public
Servants or Private Enterpeneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1469 (2005) (arguing that Rule 7.6
requires proof of illegal purpose which makes it virtually unenforceable in all but the most
extreme cases).
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CONCLUSION
At the time of this writing, the new Illinois Rules of Professional
Conduct are a work in progress. Some of the rules are, in fact, not
totally finalized. 241 However, the main structure and the content of
most of the rules seems to be in place. The ISBA/CBA Joint
Committee and the Supreme Court Committee on Professional
Responsibility should be congratulated on the very good work they did
in revising the Rules of Professional Conduct and for their thoughtful
and comprehensive reports. For the most part, they are excellent and
their proposals should be followed. However, some of the new
proposed rules need to be discussed further. Hopefully, this article will
contribute to that discussion and, eventually, to the enactment of the
best possible set of rules for our profession in the state of Illinois.
241. For example, the ISBA is currently working on an alternative to proposed Rule 5.7 which
attempts to provide guidelines on whether attorneys are subject to the Rules of Professional
Conduct when they engage in law related services that do not constitute the practice of law. The
ISBA has drafted two alternative proposals. One deals with law related services provided in
circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's practice and another that relates to non legal
services performed by an ancillary entity. ISBAICBA JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3,
at 33. For this reason the ISBA/CBA Joint Committee Report does not make any
recommendations on this issue. Id.
20081
